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ARTICLE





Mainstream pro-immigrant law reformers advocate for
better treatment of immigrants by invoking a contrast with people
convicted of a crime. This Article details the harms and limitations
of a conceptual framework for immigration reform that draws its
narrative force from a contrast with people-citizens and
noncitizens-who have been convicted of a criminal offense and
proposes an alternate approach that better aligns with racial and
class critiques of the U.S. criminal justice system. Noncitizens
with a criminal record are overwhelmingly low-income people of
color. While some have been in the United States for a short period
of time, many have resided in the United States for much longer.
Many are lawful permanent residents with strong family ties,
including U.S. citizen children. Convicted noncitizens who have
served significant time in our penal system have experienced the
well-documented harms associated with both criminal and civil
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incarceration. Despite the significant size of this population and
its location at the convergence of two heavily criticized law
enforcement regimes, these individuals rarely serve as an example
for what is wrong with our immigration system. To the contrary,
convicted noncitizens are typically regarded as foils for more
deserving immigrants. Immigration reformers are not the first to
employ a deserving/undeserving narrative as a means of obtaining
political gains for some at the expense of others. Across all areas
of law reform, policy makers and advocates have sought to
generate empathy for groups of people by invoking a contrast with
others. In drawing a contrast between a favored group and others
who are degenerate, deviant, or less deserving, the "politics of
respectability" depends on a contrast with an "out" or deviant
group. Racial justice proponents, much more than immigration
reformers, have made significant headway in moving beyond
respectability politics, especially when critiquing
hyperincarceration. This Article describes a different
conceptualization of immigrants and crime as well as examples of
how certain immigration reform groups have sought to implement
aspects of this alternate frame.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Immigrants are not criminals" is a familiar refrain in the
pro-immigrant movement for law reform. Whether the issue is
legalization of undocumented persons, heavy-handed law
enforcement practices, or the escalation in immigration detention,
mainstream law reformers often argue for better treatment of
immigrants by invoking a contrast with people convicted of a
crime.' Immigration reformers traditionally have focused on
immigrants' contributions to the nation, seeking to minimize
discussion of the percentage of immigrants caught up in the
criminal justice system. The picture painted is not one of poor,
immigrant neighborhoods besieged by overly aggressive law
enforcement tactics, but of immigrants as a model, law-abiding
group that largely exists separate and apart from such concerns.
Contesting the boundaries of the social construct of the term
''criminal," many reformers object to how activities associated with
being undocumented result in this label. Commentators have
persuasively illustrated how the increased civil incarceration of
undocumented immigrants stigmatizes all immigrants as
criminals;2 immigration law violators have been converted into
1. See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text; see also Irene Bloemraad, Kim
Voss & Taeku Lee, The Protests of 2006: What Were They, How Do We Understand Them,
Where Do We Go?, in RALLYING FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS: THE FIGHT FOR INCLUSION IN
21ST CENTURY AMERICA 3, 7 (Kim Voss & Irene Bloemraad eds., 2011) (discussing large
marches in support of immigration reform where immigrants and their supporters
carried signs stating "We Are Workers, Not Criminals"); David Bacon, 'We Are Workers,
Not Criminals," PROGRESSIVE MEDIA PROJECT (May 1, 2008), http://dbacon.igc.org
/Imgrants/2008workersnotcriminals.html (endorsing theme of immigrant march where
sign said "We are Workers, not Criminals!"); Geoffrey A. Hoffman, The Border Children-
They Are Not Criminals and They Need Counsel, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (July 21, 2014),
http://1awprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2014/07/the-border-children-they-are-not
-criminals-and-they-need-counsel-by-geoffrey-a-hoffman.html (arguing that the children
crossing the border from Central America are refugees and not criminals); Alicia Maule
& Traci G. Lee, Immigration Advocate: 'These Children Are Not Criminals', MSNBC (Oct.
10, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbe/immigrant-advocate-these-children-are-not-
criminals (asking rhetorically, "Is escaping from crime a criminal offense?"); Maria
Sacchetti, Newest Illegal Immigrants Face More Scrutiny than Many Criminals, Bos.
GLOBE (2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/07/02/asylum-seekers-often
-monitored-immigration-more-strictly-than-criminals/PZ7HOpWQJdBVhlOvUOMAL
/story.html (comparing the scrutiny placed on recent immigrants with dangerous
criminals).
2. See, e.g., Daniel I. Morales, It's Time for an Immigration Jury, 108 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 36, 42 (2013) ("Mass deportation stigmatizes all Latinos in the same way that
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criminals through the prosecution of behaviors associated with
being undocumented;3 and civil immigration enforcement has
become bound up with criminal enforcement.4 The connections
among the rise of criminal incarceration, the prison industry, and
the increase in civil detention of immigrants are well documented.5
While plainly correct, these claims implicitly rely upon a
sense of injustice that immigrants and our immigration system
have become entangled with criminals and our criminal system.
The critique risks being understood as legitimizing the category
criminal, the stigma it carries, and the use of deportation as a
crime control measure. Largely absent is a defense of people
regarded as legitimately positioned at the crossroads of our
criminal and immigration enforcement systems.
This Article details the harms and limitations of a
conceptual framework for immigration reform that draws its
narrative force from a contrast between deserving immigrants
and people-citizens and noncitizens-who have been convicted
of a criminal offense. While acknowledging the difficulties of
making political gains in a society that supports harsh penal
responses to criminal activity, I argue that immigration
reformers should adopt an understanding and portrayal of
people convicted of a crime that aligns with the racial and class
critique of hyperincarceration. This critique, popularized by
Michelle Alexander's A New Jim Crow, rejects a view of crime
as simply bad acts by pathological individuals and seeks to
retool the standard narrative about crime to emphasize the
roles of racial and class inequality.
Noncitizens with a criminal record are overwhelmingly
low-income people of color. Latinos make up the largest ethnic
group in this category, although the percentage of non-Latino
mass incarceration stigmatizes all African Americans."); Deborah Weissman, The Politics
of Narrative: Law and the Representation of Mexican Criminality, 38 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
141, 148 (2015) (discussing the "Mexican-as-criminal narrative"); The History of
Immigration Detention in the U.S., DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, http://www.detention
watchnetwork.org/node/2381 ("The very act of detention attaches the stigma of
criminalization to immigrants and enmeshes them in the U.S. criminal justice system.");
see also Nina Bernstein, In Father's Memory, Fighting to Stay in Britain, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
21, 2010, at Al (explaining how detention and deportation have stigmatized immigrants
and facilitated treating them as "scapegoats").
3. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
5. See discussion infra Part IV; see also Cdsar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hernandez,
Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1350, 1360 (2014)
(demonstrating that "the detention framework developed alongside the legislation that
permitted the mass incarceration that came to define antidrug policies in the late twentieth
century").
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black immigrants is significant.6 While some have been in the
United States for a short period of time, many have resided in the
United States for much longer. Many are lawful permanent
residents with strong family ties, including U.S. citizen children.7
While immigrants as a group are less likely to commit crimes than
native-born U.S. citizens,8 time spent in the United States is a
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2015 app. C, at 12-17 (2015), https://www.ice.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/fy2015removalStats.pdf (showing that
in 2015 Latinos constituted 97.6% of all people removed); id. fig. 1, at 2 (showing
that in 2015 convicted criminals made up 59% of all people removed). While black
convicted immigrants from Haiti, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, and Brazil make
up only 12% of ICE removals, they typically spend more time in criminal
incarceration. Tamara K. Nopper, Why Black Immigrants Matter: Refocusing the
Discussion on Racism and Immigration Enforcement, in KEEPING OUT THE OTHER:
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT TODAY 204, 209-10, 228
(David C. Brotherton & Philip Kretsedemas, eds., 2008) (discussing the patterns
of incarceration which "are most intense for black immigrants"). According to the
U.S. Government Accountability Office, reporting in 2011, 68% of convicted
noncitizens in federal prisons serving criminal sentences were from Mexico, 5%
were from the Dominican Republic, 5% were from Colombia, 3% were from Cuba,
2% from Jamaica, 2% from El Salvador, 2% from Honduras, and 1% from
Guatemala. The remaining 172 countries accounted for only 10%. U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, CRIMINAL
ALIEN STATISTICS: INFORMATION ON INCARCERATIONS, ARRESTS, AND COSTS 8-9
(Mar. 2011), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11187.pdf [hereinafter CRIMINAL
ALIEN STATISTICS]; see also MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BEREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
2010 (2013) (reporting that the race or ethnicity of offenders charged with criminal
immigration offenses in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons are: 91.6%
Hispanic or Latino, 6.4% White, 1.8% Black or African American, 0.2% American
Indian/Alaska Native, and 0.2% Asian/Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander).
As discussed infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text, a significant percentage
of the convictions of Mexicans and Central Americans stem from the increased
criminalization of illegal reentry at the U.S.-Mexico border.
7. JONATHAN BAUM ET AL., IN THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST?: THE CONSEQUENCES
OF LOSING A LAWFUL IMMIGRANT PARENT TO DEPORTATION 4 (Laurel E. Fletcher, et al.
eds., 2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edulfiles/Human-Rights-report.pdf.
8. See Joanna Almeida et al., Peer Violence Perpetration Among Urban
Adolescents: Dispelling the Myth of the Violent Immigrant, 26 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 2658, 2658, 2665 (2011) ("Recent immigrants had a significantly lower
prevalence of peer violence compared to each other generations/time in U.S. group.");
John Hagan & Alberto Palloni, Sociological Criminology and the Mythology of Hispanic
Immigration and Crime, 46 SOC. PROBS. 617, 620, 630 (1999) (concluding that Latinos
born outside the United States are less likely to be imprisoned than Whites); Sergio
Herzog, Ethnic and Immigrant Residential Concentration, and Crime Rates, 37 J.
CRIM. JUST. 427, 432 (2009) ("[R]esearch has consistently found relatively lower crime
rates for immigrants than for their native-born counterparts" citing Ramiro Martinez
Jr. and Matthew T. Lee, On Immigration and Crime, in THE NATURE OF CRIME:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS 485,
496 (2000)); Robert J. Sampson, Rethinking Crime and Immigration, CONTEXTS,
Winter 2008, at 28, 31 ("Immigrant youths committed less violence than natives.");
Matthew G. Yeager, Immigrants and Criminality: A Cross-National Review, 29 CRIM.
JUST. ABSTRACTS 143, 147 (1997) ("[I]mmigrants generally have lower propensities for
crime than their native-born counterparts."); Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison
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substantial risk factor for committing a crime.9
A wide range of criminal convictions trigger deportation, even
for people in lawful immigration status. The Anti-Drug Act of 1988
introduced the term "aggravated felony," the category of crime
that carries the most serious immigration consequences.10 Since
that time, Congress has amended the criminal provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act multiple times, including twice
Piehl, Why Are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates so Low? Evidence on Selective
Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation 24-25 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 13229, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3229 ("There is
evidence that the process of migration selects individuals who have lower criminal
propensity or are more responsive to deterrent effects than the average native."); Alex
R. Piquero et al., Longitudinal Patterns of Legal Socialization in First-Generation
Immigrants, Second-Generation Immigrants, and Native-Born Serious Youthful
Offenders 15 (Aug. 20, 2014) (online first article in CRIM. & DELINQ.),
http://cad.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/08/12/0011128714545830.full.pdf+html
[doi: 10.1177/0011128714545830] ("[First-generation immigrants are significantly
less likely to offend compared with second-generation immigrants and native-born
youth in general, and offend less chronically and violently as well."); Walter A. Ewing,
Daniel E. Martinez & Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Criminalization of Immigration in the
United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (July 8, 2015), http://immigration
policy.org/special-reports/criminalization-immigration-united-states (reporting that in
2010 1.6% of the foreign-born male population aged 18-39 was incarcerated, as opposed
to 3.3% of the native-born).
9. See Almeida et al., supra note 8, at 2659, 2671 ("[P]erpetration of violence
worsens with increased time in the U.S. [and immigrants] rapidly adopt the U.S. norms
and behaviors that support violence and aggression toward peers."). The crime rate
among U.S. citizen children born to immigrants outpaces the rate among immigrants
themselves. See Hoan N. Bui & Ornuma Thongniramol, Immigration and Self-Reported
Delinquency: The Interplay of Immigrant Generations, Gender, Race, and Ethnicity, 28
J. CRIME & JUST. 71, 81 (2005) (demonstrating that children of immigrants are more
likely to engage in delinquent behavior than immigrants); Kathleen Mullan Harris,
The Health Status and Risk Behavior of Adolescents in Immigrant Families, in
CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS: HEALTH, ADJUSTMENT, AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 286, 294
(Donald J. Hernandez ed., 1999) (commenting that children of immigrants are more
likely to engage in delinquent behavior than immigrants); Rich Morin, Crime Rises
Among Second-Generation Immigrants as They Assimilate, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 15,
2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/15/crime-rises-among-second-
generation-immigrants-as-they-assimilate/; Ruben G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the
Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation
Young Men, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (June 1, 2006), http://www.migration
policy.org/article/debunking-myth-immigrant-criminality-imprisonment-among-first-
and-second-generation-young (discussing the first generation of children born to
immigrants and concluding that "[i]ncarceration rates increase significantly for all
U.S.-born coethnics without exception"); Paul R. Smokowski, Corinne David-Ferdon &
Nancy Stroupe, Acculturation and Violence in Minority Adolescents: A Review of the
Empirical Literature, 30 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 209, 215 (2009) (children of
immigrants are more likely to engage in delinquent behavior than immigrants).
10. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342-7349, 102 Stat. 4469,
4469-73 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1228,
1252(a)(2)(C) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)); NORTON TOOBY & JOSEPH JUSTIN ROLLIN,
EVOLUTION OF THE DEFINITION OF AGGRAVATED FELONY, http://nortontooby.com/pdf/Free
Checklists/EvoAggFelonyStatute.pdf.
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in 1996.11 The definition of aggravated felony now includes crimes
that are neither aggravated nor a felony.12 At the same time, the
1996 amendments largely eliminated the U.S. Attorney General's
authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation,
prompting the U.S. Supreme Court to state that "recent changes
in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic
result for a broad class of noncitizen offender."13
A large percentage of the people deported from the United
States have been convicted of a crime. According to the federal
government, "Nearly 60 percent of [Immigration and Customs
Enforcement's] total removals had been previously convicted of a
criminal offense, and that number rises to 82 percent for
individuals removed from the interior of the U.S." 1 4 Some
noncitizens' convictions are the result of civil immigration
violations having been criminalized.5 A significant number of
noncitizens deported for a crime have relatively minor records.'6
Other noncitizens, however, have been convicted of more serious
11. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRAIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 321-34, 110 Stat. 3009-627 to -635 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012 & Supp. II 2015)); Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277-78 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012 & Supp. II 2015). The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the Immigration Act of 1990,
the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, and the IIRIRA of 1996
expanded the definition of aggravated felony. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
104-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4469-70 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012 &
Supp. 112015); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 5048 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)); Immigration and Nationality
Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4320-21 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)).
12. See, e.g., Garcia v. INS, 239 F.3d 409, 411-12 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding
misdemeanor attempted theft of rims of tires with suspended sentence of more than a year
is "aggravated felony"); United States v. Holguin-Enriquez, 120 F. Supp. 2d 969, 971, 973
(D. Kan. 2000) (holding municipal ordinance violation for assault with one year suspended
sentence is "aggravated felony"); see also Rob A. Justman, The Effects of AEDPA and
IIRIRA on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims for Failure to Advise Alien Defendants
of Deportation Consequences of Pleading Guilty to an "Aggravated Felony," 2004 UTAH L.
REV. 701, 706 ("[Ilt might be briefer to list all crimes not aggravated felonies than to list
the aggravated felonies."); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996
Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1936,
1940-41 (2000) (discussing how a crime need not be aggravated or a felony to be defined as
an "aggravated felony").
13. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
14. Bob Fredericks, 68K Undocumented Immigrants with Criminal Records Released
in 2013, N.Y. POST (Mar. 31, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/03/31/68k-undocumented-
immigrants-with-criminal-records-released-in-2013-report/; see also U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., supra note 6, at 4 (noting that the percentage of interior removals that
were of convicted criminals "grew from 82 percent in FY 2013 to 91 percent in FY
2015.. .. ").
15. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
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crimes, including violent ones.'7 Some of these noncitizens serve
long or multiple criminal sentences, languish in immigration
detention, and are then deported without the opportunity to file
for discretionary relief from removal.'8
Convicted noncitizens who have served significant time in
both criminal and immigration detention have experienced the
well-documented harms associated with our excessively
punitive criminal and immigration systems.19 Despite the
significant size of this population and its location at the
convergence of two heavily criticized law enforcement regimes,
the treatment of these individuals only rarely serves as an
example of what is broken in our immigration system.
Although pro-immigrant reformers generally embrace the
racial critique of hyperincarceration, many hesitate to place
noncitizens who have been incarcerated at the center of their
political strategies and theories, especially those noncitizens
who have been convicted of a serious offense.20 To the contrary,
these convicted noncitizens-defined only by their crime-
serve as one-dimensional foils for more respectable
immigrants.21
Reformers advocate for a legalization program for as many of
the eleven million undocumented people as possible.22 As a
secondary goal, some also seek to ameliorate our harsh
deportation laws, typically advocating for restoration of pre-1996
law that treated lawful permanent residents with certain criminal
convictions more favorably. As a practical matter, however, the
push for legalization has not only eclipsed but undermined the
movement for expanded defenses for convicted lawful permanent
residents. Many mainstream reformers view additional
enforcement, including expansion of the criminal deportation
grounds, as a regrettable but necessary trade-off to secure
17. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text; see also JOHN F. SIMANSKI, U.S.
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013, at 7,
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois-enforcement_ar_2013.pdf (enumerating
convicted noncitizens who were removed: 10.2% had assault convictions, 2.8% had burglary
convictions, 2.7% had larceny offenses, 15% had criminal traffic offenses, 15.4% had
dangerous drug offenses, 2.6% had fraudulent activity offenses, and 1.6% had sexual
assault offenses).
18. Detained immigrants are often unable to post bond due to mandatory detention.
See infra notes 92 & 169-70 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See Tom Barry, Talking About Criminal Aliens, BORDER LINEs (May 3, 2011),
http://www.borderlinesblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/talking-about-criminal-aliens.html
(discussing the avoidance of discourse about criminal aliens).
21. For a discussion of the limitations of defining people only by the worst thing they
have done in their life, see infra note 350.
22. Remarks on Immigration Reform, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. (June 11, 2013).
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legalization for undocumented immigrants who have no criminal
records or only very minor ones.23
Reformers widely agree that some convicted noncitizens
simply fall outside of the scope of reform efforts due to the serious
nature of their convictions. For example, few advocate inclusion of
undocumented immigrants like Jose Guerrero in a legalization
program.24 Jose's parents brought him to the United States from
Central America when he was seven years old. He suffers from
mental illness and, as a child, was in and out of the foster care
mental health system. As a teenager living in a poor neighborhood,
Jose was a member of a gang, and he still has a gang tattoo on his
face. After pushing a pregnant woman during a dispute, Jose was
convicted of aggravated battery and detained by immigration
authorities.
Immigration reformers broadly agree that our nation should
deport immigrants who constitute the "worst of the worst," even if
they are lawfully present.25 Although this category has fluid
boundaries, many believe that it should include people who have
been convicted of a serious violent crime, like Haitian lawful
permanent resident Ronald Beauchamp.2 6 Ronald was convicted of
attempted murder for attacking his ex-girlfriend. After the attack,
in an attempt to kill himself, Ronald drank battery acid. The acid
destroyed his esophagus and Ronald now survives on a liquid diet
delivered to his stomach through a feeding tube. After his prison
sentence, Ronald returned to his daughter, grandchildren, and
23. See Anushka Asthana, Immigrants Rights Groups Split over Senate Bill, WASH.
POST, July 28, 2006, at A14. Proposed legalization programs in 2005-2007 and 2012-2014
were conditioned on dramatic increases in capacity to detain and deport noncitizens. 109
CONG. REC. 4853-54, 4874 (2006); Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and
Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013).
24. Jose Guerrero and Ronald Beauchamp are pseudonyms.
25. Van Le, Statement from Frank Sharry on President Obama's Immigration Speech
(May 10, 2011), http://americasvoice.org/press-releases/statement from-frank.sharry
_on-president obamasimmigrationspeech/ (arguing for "bold administrative steps that focus
enforcement on the 'worst of the worst"'). The following statement of Peter Schuck reflects the
typical view of convicted noncitizens: "It is hard to think of any public policy that is less
controversial than the removal of criminal aliens." Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-
Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 107 (2012)
(quoting Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and
Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 372 (1999)). Justice William Brennan,
writing in a U.S. Supreme Court dissent, observed: '"Prisoners are persons whom most of us
would rather not think about,' he wrote. 'Banished from everyday sight, they exist in a shadow
world that only dimly enters our awareness."' C~sar Cuauhtdmoc Garcia Herndndez, The
Perverse Logic oflmmigration Detention: Unraveling the Rationality ofImprisoning Immigrants
Based on Markers of Race and Class Otherness, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 353, 354-55 (2012)
(quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
26. Even prior to 1996, Ronald Beauchamp would have been subject to deportation
and ineligible for discretionary relief to stop his deportation. See TooBY & ROLLIN, supra
note 10.
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sister in New Jersey, became a regular churchgoer, and worked as
a cab driver. He farces deportation to Haiti.
The idea that people with serious convictions, like Jose and
Ronald, deserve to be deported resonates in part because it taps
into our primordial understanding of the world in the simple
terms of good versus evil.27 Emile Durkheim theorized that, at
the societal level, we construct the category "criminals" so that
"common indignation is expressed" and "honest consciousness"
is "draw[n] . . . together."28 Social cohesion, in this view,
depends on the existence of undesirable "others."29 People's
legitimate fear of becoming a victim of crime provides further
fuel for this phenomenon, as does the sentiment that
immigrants who commit crimes should be deported because they
have abused the privilege of residing in this country.3 0
"Governing through crime" by tethering immigration policy to
crime control appears to be good government. 31 Moreover, in a
world of scarce advocacy resources and divisive politics, it seems
obvious that immigration reformers should focus on those who
have no criminal record, or at least just a minor one. The need
for political compromise means that lines must inevitably be
drawn. It appears ill-advised, if not downright irresponsible, to
sacrifice the possibility of immigration reform for many
undocumented people by holding out for gains for people with
criminal convictions like Jose and Ronald. Pushing to include
27. Elizabeth Keyes has explained the multiple psychological reasons why humans
favor simple narratives, especially those involving the clear delineation of good from bad.
Narratives help us to efficiently process information, make sense of cognitive dissonance,
and understand through engaging with what is familiar. Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints
and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System,
26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 237-40, 253 (2013); see also McLeod, supra note 25, at 123-24,
156-58, 165-67 (demonstrating how the "crime-centered conceptual framework" of
immigration law "draws on a stock crime narrative formula developed originally in crime
fiction and related imaginative literature" and involves "a pleasurable experience of
catharsis").
28. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 57-58 (1984). Michel
Foucault has argued that systems of incarceration create deviants who serve as signals
to keep others law-abiding. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON 48-49 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1st ed. 1977) (1975).
29. David Garland suggests that we can understand the demonization of convicted
people through "images, archetypes, and anxieties" as the attempt to create an
"essentialized difference" between "us" and "criminals." DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 135 (2002).
30. Adam Cox and Eric Posner argue the merits of an ex post screening system
whereby immigrants are assessed for desirability after they have resided in the United
States for a period of time, akin to probationary period. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A.
Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 826
(2007).
31. See generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007).
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immigrants with significant criminal records in reform efforts
could trigger a backlash against all immigration reform.32
These strongly held views influence how law reformers regard
noncitizens convicted of significant crimes, making it difficult to
build a theory or political agenda based on a more nuanced
understanding of crime and immigration. Despite the many
barriers to dismantling the good/bad immigrant narrative, this
Article argues for its undoing. Part II discusses popular
conceptions of immigrants who have a criminal record, illustrating
how they serve as contrasts to justify better treatment of more
deserving immigrants. Part III explains the limitations and harms
of respectability messaging in social movements, demonstrating
that such an approach not only seeks gains for some at the expense
of others but also reinforces and reproduces social and economic
inequality. Part IV describes the harms of the respectable
immigrant narrative, namely the exclusion of convicted
noncitizens from pro-immigrant reform efforts and the
legitimization of criminal and civil hyperincarceration, as
experienced by both citizens and noncitizens. The harms of
hyperincarceration are racialized and affect not only individuals
and their families but also communities and the nation as a whole.
Part V analyzes scholarly critiques of how our immigration and
criminal systems have become intertwined and immigrants have
been converted into criminals. Part VI describes a
conceptualization of immigration reform that rejects respectability
messaging, embraces a structural account of crime and illegal
border crossings, seeks to delink immigration enforcement from
crime control, and encourages coalition building with the racial
justice movement to end hyperincarceration. Part VII briefly
describes examples of how some immigration reform groups have
sought to implement aspects of this alternate approach.
II. THE CURRENT FRAME
The association of immigrants and deviancy remains firmly
implanted in the American psyche.33 Our first federal exclusion
32. On the dangers of triggering backlash in the racial justice context, see generally
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 16, 157-59 (1998).
33. See, e.g., Hagan & Palloni, supra note 8, at 618-20 (discussing mistaken public
perception of link between immigration and crime); Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant as
Criminal: Punishing Dreamers, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 79, 86 (1998) ("The process of
problematizing, demonizing, dehumanizing, and criminalizing renders punishment of
aliens a part of the American psyche."); Weissman, supra note 2, at 176-82 (discussing the
"subordinating narrative" about Mexican immigrants that "tends to focus on crime, threats
to the economy, and racial upheaval") (citing Gabriel Sanchez et al., Filling the Void:
Factors Leading to Punitive Immigration Policy Across the American States, W. POL. SC.
701
702 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [53:3
laws were aimed at Asian immigrants, described by U.S. Supreme
Court justices as inassimilable and "obnoxious."34 Early twentieth
century eugenic studies, reflecting the prevailing attitudes of the
time, dubbed southern and eastern Europeans "degenera[tes]"
because of their alleged "racial inferiority and unassimilability."3 5
After European immigrants were permitted to become "white,"
Mexicans became the new "menace."36 Haitians arriving on our
shores and Central Americans, including women with their
children, have been detained in large numbers, ostensibly on
national security grounds.37 Presidential candidates and news
sources employ alarmist and hyperbolic rhetoric when discussing
immigration and crime.38 Commentators have analyzed the
ASS'N, Working Paper, at 5 (2012), http://wpsa.research.pdx.edulmeet/2012/sanchez
gabriel.pdf). As Jennifer Chac6n observes, "The notion of the outsider as a threat is as old
as human history and it transcends national boundaries." Jennifer Chac6n, Unsecured
Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1827, 1835 (2007) [hereinafter Chac6n, Unsecured Borders].
34. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 743 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting)
(referring to "the obnoxious Chinese"); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S 581, 603,
607 (1889) (referring to Chinese immigrants when describing "the presence of foreigners of
a different race . . . who will not assimilate with us, [and considered] dangerous to [the
nation's] peace and security").
35. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 24 (2004).
36. Weissman, supra note 2, at 145 (citing Yolanda Vdzquez, Perpetuating the
Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the Incorporation of Immigration
Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 How. L.J. 639, 645 (2011)). See generally LEO R.
CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT: CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS, AND THE NATION 41-
43 (2008) (discussing the exaggerated and alarmist rhetoric about immigrants and
immigration); KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN ET AL., ILLEGALITY, NATIONAL ORIGIN CUES, AND
PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION (2010), https://polisci.osu.edulsites/polisci.osu.edu/files
/NebloNatOrgCuesO63014 -0.pdf (considering the increase in racial prejudice toward
Mexican immigrants in the past decade); Yolanda Vzquez, Constructing Crimmigration:
Latino Subordination in a "Post-Racial" World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 639 (2015)
[hereinafter Vdzquez, Constructing Crimmigration] (noting the popular sentiment that
unauthorized migrants come to the United States solely to drain social services).
37. Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration Prisons
in the United States, 10 PUB. CULTURE 577, 594 (1998) ("Haitians ... have been hurt by
being integrated into the prevailing ideological formations around race in the United
States."); see Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of America's Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas
-family-detention-camps.html (discussing the large number of immigrant families detained
upon arrival).
38. During his presidential announcement, Donald Trump said: "When Mexico sends
its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're sending people
that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing
drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people."
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump's False Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants
and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigra
nts-and-crime/. Fox News headlines describe "hordes of dangerous illegals." Todd Starnes,
Obama Unleashes Hordes of Dangerous Illegals onto American Streets, FOX NEWS (Mar. 31,
2014), http://radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/top-stories/obama-unleashes-hordes-of-dan
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nativist and racist subtexts to such messages.39 Although the
demonization of noncitizens with criminal records may be most
obvious as articulated by the political right, the practice
transcends political affiliation. While rejecting the blanket
association of immigrants and crime, the mainstream left's
standard narratives in support of immigration reform rely heavily
on a stark contrast between worthy immigrants and those who
deserve to be deported because of a criminal record. The Obama
Administration's "felons, not families" sound bite regarding
deportation policy reflects a simplistic, binary approach that
renders invisible those who simultaneously occupy both
categories.40
The stark good/bad immigrant rhetoric is most obvious when
mainstream reformers speak about Dreamers, undocumented
immigrant youth who came to the United States at a young age,
finished (or are enrolled in) school, and have no serious criminal
record.41 Dreamers occupy the far end of the good side of this
spectrum. In President Obama's words, they are "innocent young
kids" because they were too young to have any part in the decision
to come to the United States.42 In a more culpable, middle position,
are the parents of Dreamers and others who entered illegally or
who overstayed their visa. The federal government does not dub
gerous-illegals-onto-american-streets.html; see also John Tanton & Wayne Lutton,
Immigration and Crime in the USA, 18 J. SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 217, 217 (1993)
(asserting that "frighteningly large numbers of newcomers see crime as their avenue to the
American dream"). For a discussion of the linking of immigrants and crime, see Chac6n,
Unsecured Borders, supra note 33, at 1837-43.
39. See, e.g., J. David Cisneros, Contaminated Communities: The Metaphor of
"Immigrant as Pollutant" in Media Representations of Immigration, 11 RHETORIC & PUB.
AFF. 569 (2008); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Alien Language: Immigration Metaphors
and the Jurisprudence of Otherness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1545, 1569-70, 1576-78 (2011);
Hing, supra note 33, at 83; Michael Welch, Trampling Human Rights in the War on Terror:
Implications to the Sociology of Denial, 12 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5-6 (2004); see also M.
Kathleen Dingeman & Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Immigration-Crime Nexus and
Post-Deportation Experiences: En/Countering Stereotypes In Southern California and El
Salvador, 31 U. LA. VERNE L. REV. 363, 366 (2010) (noting how "media coverage of singular
events" and "popular culture" work to "project an enduring image of immigrant
communities permeated by criminal elements"). Patricia Hill Collins has analyzed how
negative "controlling images" entrench subordination. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK
FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT
68, 72, 74-78 (1990).
40. Lauren-Brooke Eisen, 'Felons, Not Families' Oversimplifies a Complex Reality,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2015, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laurenbrooke
-eisen/felons-not-families-overs_b_6212550.html.
41. For a discussion of Dreamers, the Dream Act, and comprehensive immigration
reform, see generally Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act and the
Legislative Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L. REV.
1757 (2009).
42. Remarks on Immigration Reform and Exchange with Reporters, 2012 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. (June 15, 2012).
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these people "criminals" but "rule breakers," and draws a contrast
between these rule breakers and those immigrants who are
"looking for . . . trouble."43
The "innocent-rule breaker--criminal" messaging is an
expressly political strategy. Despite the unprecedented
immigration enforcement of the last seven years, conservatives
have successfully portrayed the current Administration as soft on
immigration.44 To counteract this image and to build credibility in
the push for comprehensive immigration reform, the White House
has kept its foot on the gas of enforcement both at the border and
in the interior of the country.45 The Administration seeks approval
for the fact that "deportation of criminals is at its highest level
ever,"4 6  with deportations reaching 400,000 in 2013.47
Enforcement practices aimed at people in both federal and state
criminal custody have increased, with the express goal of removing
immigrant defendants "at the end of their sentences" before they
"re-enter[] our communities."4 8 Criminal prosecutions of
immigration offenses, like illegal reentry, have increased by 22.6%
43. Id.
44. Andrew Elfenbein, Deportations Show Obama Can Not Win, LIBERTY VOICE (Apr.
6, 2014), http://guardianlv.com/2014/04/deportations-show-obama-can-not-win/comment
-page-1/ ("Obama will always be considered soft on immigration by Republicans."); Alan
Gomez, Deportation Policy Could Define Obama Legacy, USA TODAY (July 30, 2014, 8:32
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/30/voices-gomez-obama-immi
gration-legacy/13287195/ ("Everywhere you turn, President Obama is getting beaten up
over immigration.... One day, someone's telling me he's been too soft on the nation's 12
million undocumented immigrants. The next, someone calls him the 'deporter in chief."').
45. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 236 (2014) ("The Obama administration has justified its
tough-on-immigration stance in the name of creating fertile political space for
comprehensive immigration reform legislation."); Guy Adams, Obama Goes on Offensive
Over Immigration World, INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (Oct. 25, 2011, 9:51 AM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/obama-goes-on-offensive-over-immigr
ation-2282690.html ("[Tihe President launched an uncharacteristically aggressive attack
on Republicans who call him 'soft' on immigration, saying that since taking office he has
'strengthened border security beyond what many believed was possible."'). The Obama
Administration's pressure to push forward with heavy handed enforcement in order to
maintain credibility on immigration reform is not unlike the pressure felt by liberals in the
1960s who were forced to agree with a strong crime control approach in order to not appear
as if they were excusing mob violence. See Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the
Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 230, 237 (2007),
http://www.ebonterr.com/site-editorlassets/EBONTERR-41.pdf.
46. Remarks on Immigration Reform, supra note 22.
47. Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Deportations ofImmigrants
Reach Record High in 2013, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.pewres
earch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-of-immigrants-reach-record-high-in-2013/.
48. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, FACT SHEET: FIXING OUR
BROKEN IMMIGRATION SYSTEM SO EVERYONE PLAYS BY THE RULES (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-our-broken-immig
ration-system-so-everyone-plays -rules.
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in the last five years.49 In ratcheting up immigration enforcement,
the White House has made crime-control even more salient to
immigration policy and deepened the hold on our collective
imagination of the over-simplified categories of "criminal" as bad
and "noncriminal" as good.
Mainstream immigration reformers, interested in workable,
compromise solutions, have largely endorsed the tethering of
immigration policy to crime control. The American Immigration
Lawyers Association, the largest immigration bar association, has
sanctioned the Administration's agenda of fighting crime through
immigration policy, stating that "[a] more effective program would
concentrate solely on apprehended persons who are in fact serious
and dangerous criminals."50 The American Immigration Council
similarly claims that "most of the people being deported are not
dangerous criminals," such that the Administration is not really
deporting the "worst of the worst."5 1
Framing the problem as the fact that immigrants are
criminalized for minor infractions, however, suggests that the
solution is simply for immigration enforcement officers to stop
targeting immigration law violators and return to legitimate
targets, the "worst of the worst" immigrants. The punishment of
deportation, in this view, can be an appropriate mechanism for
crime control, as long as it has the right focus. 52 This approach
characterizes the core problems as poor calibration (i.e.,
deportation for minor crimes) and doublespeak (i.e., contradiction
between what the Administration says and what immigration
49. Obama Admin Hits All-Time High on Prosecutions for Nonviolent Immigration
Offenses, RUSS. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2013, 12:38 AM), http://rt.com/usa/prosecution
-immigration-offenses-record-351/; Written Statement to Senate Judiciary Committee on
"Immigration Enforcement Policies", HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 21, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/news/20 15/07/21/written-statement-senate-judiciary-committee-
immigration-enforcement-policies. Presiding over illegal entry cases for ten years has left
one U.S. District Judge in New Mexico feeling like he oversees "a process that destroys
families every day and several times each day." Id.
50. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS Assoc., TESTIMONY OF THE WASHINGTON, D.C.
CHAPTER OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION: "IS SECURE
COMMUNITIES KEEPING OUR COMMUNITIES SECURE?" 2 (2011), http://www.aila.org/content
/default.aspx?docid=37773.
51. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., MISPLACED PRIORITIES:
MOST IMMIGRANTS DEPORTED BY ICE IN 2013 WERE A THREAT TO No ONE (2014),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/misplaced-priorities-most-immigrants-deport
ed-ice-2013-were-threat-no-one; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED APART (BY THE
NUMBERS): NON-CITIZENS DEPORTED MOSTLY FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENSES 32 (2009),
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/04/15/forced-apart-numbers (reporting that, since
1996, only 14% of deportations for crimes have been for offenses involving violence against
people).
52. Le, supra note 25 (arguing for "bold administrative steps that focus enforcement
on the 'worst of the worst"').
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enforcement officials do). Left unchallenged are the assumptions
that deportation is justified for noncitizens convicted of an
ill-defined category of major crimes and that deportation is an
appropriate tool in crime control.
III. THE LIMITS OF RESPECTABILITY MESSAGING
Immigration reformers are not the first to employ a
deserving/undeserving narrative as a means of obtaining political
gains for some at the expense of others. Across all areas of law
reform, policy makers and advocates have sought to generate
empathy for groups of people by invoking a contrast with others.
This Part discusses the downsides of this approach.
In 1993, Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham used the phrase
"politics of respectability" to describe the way in which the
women's movement of the Black Baptist Church sought political
gains for black people from 1880 to 1920.53 She describes how black
Baptist women opposed white supremacy by "claiming
respectability through . .. manners and morals, poor black women
boldly asserted the will and agency to define themselves outside
the parameters of prevailing racist discourses."54 Cognizant that
nonthreatening collaborations with whites were the most
successful, leaders "focused on behavior modification or self-help
strategies on the part of African Americans, not on demands for
structural changes in American laws and institutions."5 5 In so
doing, however, the women failed to challenge, and thereby
perpetuated, "the hegemonic values of white America" and the
"prevalent stereotypical images of blacks."56 Without diminishing
the sophisticated, strong, and strategic political voice of the
Baptist women's movement, Higginbotham concluded that "the
politics of respectability" "served inevitably to blame blacks for
their victimization."5 7
Respectability messaging has appeared throughout the
movement for racial justice. Khalil Gibran Muhammad has traced
how "black elites" at the turn of the twentieth century, such as
W.E.B. Du Bois, often employed the language of "racial uplift" in
addition to "root-cause solutions" to black criminality.58 Today,
53. See EVELYN BROOKS HIGGINBOTHAM, RIGHTEOUS DISCONTENT: THE WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT IN THE BLACK BAPTIST CHURCH 1880-1920, at 185-86 (1993).
54. Id. at 192.
55. Id. at 197.
56. Id. at 187-88, 194-95.
57. Id. at 202.
58. KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME,
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 9-10 (2010) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
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Randall Kennedy argues that black people must adopt the politics
of respectability in order to achieve gains in white-dominated
society.59
The "politics of respectability" suffers from at least two major
limitations. First, claims to respectability depend on a contrast
with an "out" or deviant group. People are respectable by virtue of
not having certain characteristics possessed by others.60 By
definition, attaining gains for the "respectable" leaves others out.
Respectability is a moral claim of being better, and thus more
deserving, than others.61 The claim of who counts as respectable is
ideological and therefore malleable. In the context of racial justice,
Regina Austin has explained, "[T]he politics of distinction [have]
intensifie[d] divisions within 'the [Black] community"' by favoring
the middle class and "the most exceptional."62
Second, any claim to respectability reinforces and reproduces
existing social and economic inequalities in our society. Because a
person is respectable by virtue of complying with hegemonic
norms, any claim of respectability legitimizes and perpetuates
these norms. Respectability narratives not only "reflect[]" "social
realit[y]" but are "constructive" of it.63 If limited to helping
respectable people, reforms will never fully address societal
inequalities that inevitably surface where the less favored are
59. KENNEDY, supra note 32, at 17 (arguing that Blacks must show they "are capable
of meeting the established moral standards of white middle-class Americans"). For critiques
of Kennedy's argument, see Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime,
and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1270, 1285 (1998); David Cole, The Paradox of Race and
Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction," 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2558,
1269-71 (1995); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Respectability, Race Neutrality, and Truth, 107 YALE
L.J. 2619, 2631 (1998) (reviewing KENNEDY, supra note 32). Others have commented on the
perils of respectability messaging as it relates to racial justice. See, e.g., CATHY J. COHEN,
DEMOCRACY REMIXED: BLACK YOUTH AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 48 (2010);
Jody Armour, Nigga Theory: Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity in the Substantive
Criminal Law, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 14-15 (2014); Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the
Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 966, 1013-14, 1042, 1043 (2002).
60. See KENNEDY, supra note 32, at 18 (explaining how the politics of respectability
has caused some blacks to "shun anything that might remotely be associated with 'bad
Negroes').
61. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 53, at 188, 195 (describing how the Black Baptist
Church promoted respectability through emphasis on manners and morals with the
ultimate goal of constructing a "Public Negro Self' worthy of respect).
62. Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1773 (1992) (commenting on the "politics of
distinction" theory of racial justice).
63. Weissman, supra note 2, at 149 (citing Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and
Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 232 (1983) (discussing how law is "constructive of social realities rather
than merely reflective of them")). See generally CLARISSA RILE HAYWARD, HOW AMERICANS
MAKE RACE: STORIES, INSTITUTIONS, SPACES 177, 183-84 (2013) (demonstrating how
narratives of racial identity become institutionalized and reproduced).
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located.64 In this way, invocation of the deserving/undeserving
distinction prevents more fundamental, structural change in our
society. In the context of racial justice, the focus on respectability
has encouraged calls for individual reformation based on culture
and values and thwarted policy changes grounded in an
understanding of the connections among criminality, racism, and
social and economic inequality.
The politics of respectability lurk in every movement for social
change. In the welfare rights arena, lines are drawn between the
"deserving" poor (for example, the disabled, blind, and elderly) and
the "undeserving" poor (able-bodied people viewed as employable,
including single mothers).65 The deserving poor, as Joel Handler
has observed, "possess attributes which could readily justify public
protection and care without challenging dominant cultural,
economic, and political norms." 66 In contrast, the "undeserving
poor ... challenge such norms."67
The phenomenon also exists in the movement against gender
violence. Over the last four decades, the anti-violence movement
unquestionably has succeeded in important ways.68 Law
enforcement authorities no longer view domestic violence as a
64. See ANGE-MARIE HANCOCK, THE POLITICS OF DISGUST: THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF
THE WELFARE QUEEN 60-62 (2004) (describing how American society has shaped welfare
policy to address the problems of individuals with characteristics deemed deserving of help
while ignoring or excluding the claims of black, single mothers who are perceived as abusive
of the system and thus undeserving of help).
65. See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: AMERICA'S ENDURING
CONFRONTATION WITH POVERTY 3 (2d ed. 2013); Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters
in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 810-16 (2007) (arguing that the distinction between
the deserving and undeserving poor is based on race and class); Richard Hardack, Bad
Faith: Race, Religion and the Reformation of Welfare Law, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICS J. 539, 616 (2006) (citing William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the
Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431,1492 (1986)) (describing the "deserving poor" as "the
sexually ascetic, monogamous, frugal, tidy, and white"); see also Kathleen A. Kost & Frank
W. Munger, Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: 1990's Welfare Reform and the
Exploitation of American Values, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 3, 5 (1996) (noting that "debates
about welfare policy in America ... focus on which of the poor are deserving and which are
not"); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO.
L.J. 1499, 1505-O8 (1991) (discussing the "deserving" versus the "undeserving" poor).
66. Joel F. Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle": The Interpretation of
Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV.
899, 944 (1990).
67. Id.
68. Leigh Goodmark notes that "[n]ot until the 1970s did the criminal system begin
to treat assaults committed by intimate partners in the same way that it handled assaults
committed by strangers." Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?:
Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIs U. PUB.
L. REV. 7, 13 (2004); see also Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence
Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 3, 9-13 (1999) (describing the history of the domestic violence movement and
gains in enforcement of domestic violence laws).
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private matter insulated from state intervention.69 Domestic
violence rates and intimate partner homicides have followed a
pronounced downward trend since the mid-1970s when federal
programs aimed at curbing intimate partner violence were
enacted.70 At the same time, high levels of violence persist and the
movement has failed to adequately improve the lives of certain
overlapping classes of women, including women of color, women
who have criminal convictions, immigrants, and poor women.7' By
69. Goodmark, supra note 68, at 13.
70. See STOP ABUSIVE & VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS (SAVE), How EFFECTIVE ARE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROGRAMS IN STOPPING PARTNER ABUSE? (2010), http://www.save
services.org/reports/; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NONFATAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
2003-2012, at 3-4 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndv0312.pdf.
71. See, e.g., ANANNYA BHATTACHARJEE, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., WHOSE SAFETY?
WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE VIOLENCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 26-27 (2001) (explaining how
the movement against gender violence has failed to improve the lives of women of color and
uneducated women immigrants); ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND
FEMINIST LAWMAKING 69-70 (2000) (positing the need to expand the definition of domestic
abuse beyond the "traditional heterosexual framework" in order for the anti-violence
movement to reach the lesbian community); Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law
Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 808-12
(2001) (criticizing domestic violence researchers' disproportionate focus on the experiences
of economically advantaged women and white women); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1241, 1255 (1991) (commenting how "patriarchal ideas about gender and power"
have caused politicians to exclude domestic violence as "another compelling incidence of
Black-on-Black crime"); Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L.
REV. 581, 618-26 (2009) ("Victims' right rhetoric ... does not tolerate victims who are
criminals .... ); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 601 (1990) ("Black women have simultaneously acknowledged their own
victimization and the victimization of black men by a system that has consistently ignored
violence against women while perpetrating it against men."); Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of
Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Native" Subject in International/Post-colonial
Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 9-12 (2002) (criticizing the violence
against women campaign's failure to understand how-in addition to gender-race,
religion, and class mediate women's lives); Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 2195, 2218-20 (2000) (arguing for expanded legal protections against violence and
inequality); G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and
the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 281-82,
289-90 (2005) (noting that criminal prosecution of the offender is the only recourse
available to victims of domestic violence, which ignores the economic needs of low-income
women who may have just lost a significant source of income); Beth E. Richie, A Black
Feminist Reflection on the Antiviolence Movement, 25 SIGNS 1133, 1135-36 (2000)
(explaining how the "assumed race and class neutrality of gender violence led to the erasure
of low-income women and women of color" from domestic violence discourse); Jenny Rivera,
The Violence Against WomenAct and the Construction ofMultiple Consciousness in the Civil
Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL. 463, 508-09 (1996) (proposing a "fair-share"
approach to distribution requirements under anti-violence legislation where funding
distributed to victims of domestic violence is proportionate to the amount of violence
experienced by the particular sub-group's race, ethnicity, and immigration status);
Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal
Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567, 576-77 (1990) (noting that not every state affords
legal protection to lesbians involved in violent relationships); Karin Wang, Battered Asian
American Women: Community Responses from the Battered Women's Movement and the
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framing gender violence as affecting equally women from all
economic classes, the movement has ignored the reality that
intimate partner violence disproportionately affects poor
communities and has distanced itself from the anti-poverty
movement.72 Women with criminal convictions and sex workers,
among others, fall outside the mainstream movement's focus of
concern.73
Similarly, in the anti-human trafficking and international
human rights antiviolence movements, critics have called into
question the use of innocent victims as exemplars, thereby
"assert[ing] respectability at the price of other less respectable
women."7 4 The practice of placing only women deemed respectable
by mainstream society at the center of the antiviolence movement
not only leaves other women more vulnerable to harm, but it shifts
the focus away from remedying the underlying conditions in which
Asian American Community, 3 ASIAN L.J. 151, 153-54 (1996) ("American society and laws,
which are constructed largely along binary lines .. . have great difficulty recognizing
intersectionalities and effectively ignore those-such as battered Asian American women-
who exist at intersections of identity."). See also Mark Matthew Graham, Domestic Violence
Victims and Welfare "Reform": The Family Violence Option in Illinois, 5 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 433, 470, 476 (2002) (observing that advocates against domestic violence "garner
support. . . by unfortunately appealing to the ideology of the 'deserving poor' and the
'victim"' and that "[s]uch tactics may be a concession to political reality, but political
expediency may come at the price of eroding a broader coalition working for true welfare
reform, which tackles the problem of poverty").
72. See Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Character, and Social Change in the Welfare
Reform Debate, 19 LAW & POL'Y 205, 223-24 (1997) (contrasting the approaches of the
movement to end gender violence and that to end poverty); Deborah M. Weissman, Law,
Social Movements, and the Political Economy of Domestic Violence, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL'Y 221, 237, 243 (2013) (criticizing the dominant approach to ending violence against
women and calling for a structural, economic analysis of gender-based violence); Deborah
M. Weissman, The Personal Is Political-and Economic: Rethinking Domestic Violence,
2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 390 [hereinafter Weissman, The Personal Is Political] (arguing
that "domestic violence is better understood by theorizing household relationships in the
context of the communities in which they live" and that that there is a "correlation between
economic strain and an increase in incidents of intimate partner violence").
73. Beverly Balos and Mary Louise Fellows have described how
"reformers ... portray the victims of violence as respectable women," thereby preventing
the reform of prostitution laws and perpetuating inequality. Beverly Balos & Mary Louise
Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution: Becoming Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1220, 1273, 1291
(1999). Balos and Fellows argue that law reformers have mistakenly sought to "distance
the dynamics of domestic abuse from prostitution." Id. at 1242; see also Pooja Gehi & Soniya
Munshi, Connecting State Violence and Anti-Violence: An Examination of the Impact of
VAWA and Hate Crimes Legislation on Asian American Communities, 21 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5,
5 (2014) (examining how certain "legislative acts exclude, neglect, and punish survivors
who deviate from the parameters of the 'model minority victim"').
74. Alice M. Miller, Sexuality, Violence Against Women, and Human Rights: Women
Make Demands and Ladies Get Protection, 7 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 16, 36-37 (2004); see
also Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic
Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157, 195-97 (2007) (discussing the difference
between real and ideal survivors).
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violence occurs.75 Thus, the downside of respectability messaging
is that it not only limits the benefits of social change to a favored
class, but it legitimizes the status quo economic, political, and
social arrangements, making it less likely that more fundamental
change will occur.
IV. RESPECTABLE IMMIGRANTS AND THE CARCERAL STATE
When immigration reformers focus solely on immigrants
without criminal records (or just minor ones), they perpetuate the
respectable immigrant narrative. They reduce noncitizens with
significant criminal records to irredeemable others-legitimate
targets for enforcement.76 The focus on respectability makes it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to argue that immigrants
with a significant criminal record should be given an opportunity
to remain in the United States. But the harms extend beyond the
effect on excluded individuals. The respectable immigrant
narrative deepens the link between crime control and immigration
enforcement, reifies our carceral state, and endorses extant
societal inequalities that foster criminal activity. 7 The failure to
challenge overly punitive practices directed at immigrants with
significant criminal convictions perpetuates the individual,
familial, community, monetary, and structural harms of our
massive criminal and immigration enforcement systems. Because
immigrants with criminal records lie at the intersection of our
criminal and immigration enforcement systems, they experience
the individual and collective harms of both regimes.78
The considerable harms of our carceral nation are discussed
in detail elsewhere but bear mention here.9 Per capita, the U.S.
75. Kimberl6 Crenshaw argues that "[t]he structural and political dimensions of
gender violence and mass incarceration are linked in multiple ways." Kimberl6 Crenshaw,
From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race,
and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1418 (2012).
76. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 397-402 (2006) [hereinafter Stumpf, The Crimmigration
Crisis].
77. For a parallel analysis of how hate crime legislation intended to protect the gay
community may perpetuate inequality and violence, see Dean Spade, Their Laws Will Never
Make Us Safer, in AGAINST EQUALITY: PRISONS WILL NOT PROTECT YOU 1, 6-7 (Ryan
Conrad ed., 2012).
78. Stumpf, Crimmigration Crisis, supra note 76, at 380-81 (highlighting the overlap
between criminal and immigration laws).
79. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts. Retribution, Representation,
and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1169 (2004) (discussing
the harms of criminal disenfranchisement); Ian F. Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial
Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2010)
(describing the racial dimension of mass incarceration); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and
the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the 'War on Drugs" Was A "War on Blacks", 6 J.
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criminal and immigration enforcement systems detain more
people for longer periods of time than any other country in the
world.80 On any given day, we have approximately 2,200,000
people in our criminal jails and prisons and 6,900,000 under
some form of adult correctional supervision.8 1 Seven-and-a-half
percent of our adult population are felons or ex-felons.82 Our
criminal incarceration rate is comparable only to Russia.83 We
criminally incarcerate over five times more people per capita
than the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, and other
similar countries.84 One of every nine individuals incarcerated is
GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 386 (2002) (arguing that the policies implemented in the name
War on Drugs were a way for certain races to express dominance over others); Michael Pinard,
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 490 (2010) (offering examples of collateral harms suffered by of individuals
in the United States with criminal records, including exclusion from public or
government-assisted housing, employment-related legal barriers, ineligibility for public
benefits, and felon disenfranchisement); Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black
Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005, 1012
(2001) (explaining the relationship between incarceration and damage to child welfare);
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281-91 (2004) (explaining how mass imprisonment
damages social networks, distorts social norms, and destroys social citizenship).
80. See CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., CTR. FOR LAW & GLOB. JUSTICE, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 9 (2012), http://fair
sentencingofyouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Cruel-And-Unusual-2.pdf; ROY
WALMSLEY, INT'L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (10th ed.
2013), http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/wppl_10.pdf;
see also Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 467, 469 (James Q.
Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011) ("[T]he United States [has] the largest per capita
confinement population in the world. . . ."); Trevor Rosson, Booknote, Harsh Justice:
Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide Between America and Europe by James
Q. Whitman, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 317, 317 (2004); United States Detention Profile, GLOBAL
DETENTION PROJECT, http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/americas/united-
states/introduction.html (last updated Mar. 2009) ("The United States maintains the
largest immigration detention infrastructure in the world. . . . An official Immigration
and Customs Enforcement database, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act,
showed a U.S. detainee population of exactly 32,000 on the evening of [January 25,
2009]." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
81. DANIELLE KAEBLE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014, at 2 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content
/pub/pdf/cpusl4.pdf.; Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole
Pie 2015, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports
/pie20l5.html.
82. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 45, at 1.
83. LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUC. FUND, A SECOND CHANCE: CHARTING A NEW
COURSE FOR RE-ENTRY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 1, 6 (2013), http://civilrights
docs.info/pdf/reports/ASecondChanceRe-EntryReport.pdf [hereinafter A SECOND
CHANCE] ("[A]fter America surpassed Russia in 1991, no other country has had a
higher rate of incarceration."); Charles Patton III, Incarceration Data: Selected
Comparisons, 2 RACE/ETHNICITY: MULTIDISCIPLINARY GLOB. CONTEXTS 151, 154
(2008).
84. Patton III, supra note 83, at 154. See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH
JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND
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serving a life sentence.85 The United States is regarded "as the
most punitive nation in the world with moderate crime rates."8 6
In particular, the United States punishes drug offenders and
property offenders much more harshly than similarly situated
countries.87 Penal controls extend well beyond prison and jail
and include an extensive system of state controls like
probation.88
In parallel to the rise in criminal incarceration, civil
immigration enforcement has steadily increased over the last
twenty years and is now far more expansive than that of any
other country. In 1996, the United States held approximately
6,600 people in immigration detention on any given day.89
Today, we hold over 26,000 immigrants in jails and jail-like
detention centers.90 In 2013, the United States detained a total
of 440,000 people in over 250 facilities.91 U.S. detention policy is
so sweeping that people who pose neither security nor flight
risks are detained, often for over four months to well over a
EUROPE 56-57 (2003) (discussing how the growth in American prison populations is a result
of American convicts serving sentences roughly five to ten times longer than similarly
situated French convicts).
85. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 45, at 170.
86. James P. Lynch & William Alex Pridemore, Crime in International Perspective,
in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 5, 7 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011).
87. Id. at 38 ("The United States imposes prison and jail sentences in 67 percent of
drug cases" and "imposes much longer sentences than any of the other nations studied.").
In Western European countries, the commission of nonviolent property offenses generally
does not lead to incarceration. James Q. Whitman, The Comparative Study of Criminal
Punishment, 1 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sc., Dec. 2005, at 17, 31.
88. One in twenty-three adults are under state control of some kind. GOTTSCHALK,
supra note 45, at 1.
89. See Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Detention,
65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 365 (2014).
90. The L.A. Times reports that the "average daily detainee population is 26,374 for
fiscal year 2015." Kate Linthicurn, ICE Opens 400-bed Immigrant Detention Center near
Bakersfield, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2015, 10:01 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-In-ice-immigration-detention-mcfarland-20150323-story.html; see also NAT'L
IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY COSTS FOR
IMMIGRATION DETENTION Do NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES 1-3 (2013),
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/mathofimmigrationdetention.pdf.
Congress issued a "bed mandate" in 2014 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014
requiring the Department of Homeland Security to "maintain a level of not less than 34,000
detention beds." Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat.
251. Although Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson has stated that the bed
mandate does not require that the detention beds be filled, detention levels remain high.
See Esther Yu-Hsi Lee, Homeland Security Head Insists 'Bed Mandate'Is Not a Quota to
Fill Detention Centers, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 12, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://thinkprogress.org
/immigration/2014/03/12/339191 /jeh-johnson-bed-mandate-quotal.
91. SIMANSKI, supra note 17, at 1; Migration & Refugee Servs. et al., Human Dignity:
A Plan to Transform the Immigrant Detention System, 3 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SOC'Y
159, 162, 169 (2015).
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year.92 Immigration detention began to escalate in the 1980s
after officials began large-scale enforcement actions, including
in the interior of the country, and abandoned a policy under
which people were released while awaiting their immigration
court hearings.93
This colossal carceral system comes with a high price tag.
State and local governments spend approximately $80 billion a
year imprisoning people charged with or convicted of a crime.94
The federal government spends about $6.5 billion on criminal
incarceration95 and $1.84 billion a year on immigration detention,
approximately $159 a day per detained noncitizen.96 According to
a study by a former Commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and
92. See Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
42, 48 (2010) (noting the lack of individual bond hearings has led to detention of people who
are not security or flight risks). The federal government argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
requires indefinite mandatory detention of noncitizens, including lawful permanent
residents, without individual custody determinations. Id. at 45. Each year, 19,000 are held
for over four months and 2,100 for over a year. Id. at 49 (citing DONALD KERWIN & SERENA
YI-YING LIN, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., IMMIGRANT DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET ITS LEGAL
IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES? 16-20 (2009),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/researchlimmigrant-detention-can-ice-meet-its-legal-impe
ratives-and-case-management-responsibilities). For further discussion of mandatory
detention, see infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
93. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., OIG-09-52, IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT DETENTION BEDSPACE MANAGEMENT 2 (2009),
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assetsfMgmt/OIG_09-52_Apr09.pdf (citing poor attendance rates at
immigration court hearings). Immigration officials began routinely detaining people
instead of using alternatives to detention, like reporting on supervision. NAT'L
IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 90, at 11 (arguing detention costs could be reduced by 80%
with the use of alternatives to detention); see also LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE
SERV., UNLOCKING LIBERTY: A WAY FORWARD FOR U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION POLICY
14, 16 (2012), http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/RPTUNLOCKINGLIBERTY.pdf.
94. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2013), http://www.justice.gov/ag/smart-on-crime.pdf
[hereinafter SMART ON CRIME]. In 2009, the Pew Center reported $52 billion. PEW CTR. ON
THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 11 (2009),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/medialAssets/2009/03/02/PSPP_1in31_reportFINALWEB_3
2609.pdf; see also TRACY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE
CORRECTIONS EXPENDITURES, 1982-2010, at 1 (rev. 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content
/pub/pdf/scefy8210.pdf. The Attorney General has reported that "[a]t the state level, costs
for running corrections facilities have roughly tripled in the last three decades . . . [and] [a]t
the federal level, the Bureau of Prisons comprises one-third of the Justice Department's
budget." SMART ON CRIME, supra note 94, at 2-3.
95. BUREAU OF PRISONS, FY 2014 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE 1,
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmdlegacy/2014/05/26/bop.pdf(last vi ited Feb. 6,
2016).
96. NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 90, at 1 ("This funding level would
amount to $5 million per day spent on immigration detention .. . [or] $159 per day [per
person]."); see also DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP'TOF HOMEIAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about
/offices/odpp/pdflice-detention-rpt.pdf (reporting that the Office of Detention and Removal
Operations operating budget in 2009 was $2.6 billion); SIMANSKI, supra note 17, at 6 ("ICE
detained 440,557 aliens during 2013.. . .").
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Naturalization Service, the United States "spends more on
immigration enforcement agencies than on all its other principal
criminal federal law enforcement agencies combined."97 The
upshot of the United States' criminal and civil enforcement
practice has been a boon like no other for the prison industry.98
Counties throughout the country have signed lucrative contracts
to hold immigrants in their empty beds, often mixed in with
pretrial criminal detainees.99 Corrections Corporation of America,
the private prison leader, expressly links its profitability to both
immigration and the war on drugs.100 In the immigration context,
private prison companies have contracted with the federal
government to build new facilities, often in remote areas and with
poor conditions.101
97. DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 9 (2013), http://migration
policy.org/researchlimmigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidable-machinery.
98. Michael Welch, The Role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the
Prison-Industrial Complex, 27 SOc. JUST. 73, 82 (2000); Gretchen Gavett, Map: The U.S.
Immigration Detention Boom, PBS (Oct. 18, 2011, 7:54 PM), http://pbs.org/wgbhlpages
/frontline/race-multicultural/lost-in-detention/map-the-u-s-immigration-detention-boom/;
see also Judith A. Greene, Entrepreneurial Corrections: Incarceration As a Business
Opportunity, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT 95,99-100, 111 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (discussing
the history of the prison-industrial complex).
99. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 93, at 2 (noting that ICE contracts
with "more than 350 state and local government facilities through intergovernmental
service agreements," or detention of "approximately 52 % of the detainee population
annually"); Schriro, supra note 96, at 10 (describing where immigration detainees are held
and stating that approximately 240 "shared-use" county jails "also house county prisoners
and sometimes, other inmates").
100. See CODY MASON, SENTENCING PROJECT, DOLLARS AND DETAINEES: THE GROWTH
OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION 4-5, 13 (2012), http://sentencingproject.org/doc
/publications/ineDollars-andDetainees.pdf (explaining how ICE's increased use of
private prisons for immigration detention created opportunities for private prison
companies); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 59 (2010) (attributing the recent incarceration rate explosion
to the War on Drugs). The Detention Watch Network reports that "[iun its 2007 Security
and Exchange Commission filing, CCA acknowledged" that it was "dependent on
government appropriations" and that "[t]he demand for [their] facilities and services could
be adversely affected by the relaxation of enforcement efforts or through decriminalization
of certain activities that are currently proscribed by our criminal laws." A Brief History of
Private Prisons in Immigration Detention, DET. WATCH NETWORK (internal quotations
omitted), http://detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons-note2 (last visited Feb. 6,
2016). The Network reports that CCA spent over 18 million on lobbying the federal
government from 1999 to 2009. The Influence of the Private Prison Industry in Immigration
Detention, DET. WATCH NETWORK, http://detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons (last
visited Feb. 6, 2016).
101. Spencer Bruck, The Impact of Constitutional Liability and Private Contracting on
Health Care Services for Immigrants in Civil Detention, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 487, 489
(2011) (arguing that the interplay of private contracting and public detention-center
standards results in unconstitutionally poor conditions for detainees); Stephen Raher, The
Business of Punishing: Impediments to Accountability in the Private Corrections Industry,
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Hyperincarceration has a disturbing racial dimension.1 0 2
People of color, primarily Latinos, make up the vast majority of
detained and deported immigrants, including both documented
and undocumented immigrants.103 With respect to criminal
incarceration, white people make up 77% of the U.S. population,
but 47% of those jailed or imprisoned in 2014.104 Latinos constitute
17% of the population and approximately 15% of the prison
population.105 Black people make up 13% of the U.S. population,
but 35% of the criminal inmate population.106 One in three black
men and one in six Latino men born today are likely to be
incarcerated in their lifetime, compared to one in 17 white men.10 7
Although women make up only 6.6% of inmates, the rate at which
women are imprisoned is rising while the rate for men is falling. 108
13 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 209, 229-47 (2010) (discussing lack of accountability for poor
conditions in private prisons); Chris Kirkham, Private Prisons: Immigration Convictions in
Record Numbers Fueling Corporate Profits, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/27/private-prisons-immigration n 1917636.html
(reporting that immigrants convicted of immigration crimes like re-entry started to be held
in "private prisons operated by multibillion-dollar corporations that contract with the
government"). For a discussion of the conditions of immigration detention, see infra notes
142-48 and accompanying text.
102. PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A Hip-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE 36-37 (2009);
GARY LAFREE, LOSING LEGITIMACY: STREET CRIME AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA 49.(1998); Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S.
Prison Populations Revisited 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 743, 750-51 (1993); Frank Rudy Cooper,
We Are Always Already Imprisoned: Hyper-Incarceration and Black Male Identity
Performance, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1185, 1191 (2013); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the
Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the 'War on Drugs' was a 'War on Blacks,' 6 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 381, 391-92 (2002); Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects
of Drugs and Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, in THINKING ABOUT PUNISHMENT:
PENAL POLICY ACROSS SPACE, TIME AND DISCIPLINE 81, 81-82 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009).
103. See supra note 6.
104. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR
2014, at 1 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdfljiml4.pdf; Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/00 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
105. MINTON & ZENG, supra note 104, at 1; Quickfacts, supra note 104.
106. MINTON & ZENG, supra note 104, at 1; Quickfacts, supra note 104.
107. SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications
/rdICCPR%2ORace%20and%2OJustice%2OShadow%2OReport.pdf (deducing that given
"current trends" "one of every three black American males born today can expect o go to
prison in his lifetime"); Vijay Prashad, From Plantation to Penal Slavery, 30 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 2237, 2241 (1995) ("The figures for incarcerated black males are remarkable: 23 per
cent of all black males between the ages of 20 and 29 are in jail and there are more black
men in jail than in college.") (citing MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK
MEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM 3 (1990)); see
also David D. Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration? 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27,
29 (2011) (noting that our society would change the law if one third of young white men
were in the criminal justice system).
108. BOP Statistics: Inmate Gender, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov
/about/statistics/statisticsjinmate-gender.jsp (last updated Dec. 26, 2015). Kimberl6 W.
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The racial disparity with respect to women is even more
pronounced than it is for men. One in 18 black women and one in
45 Latina women are likely to be imprisoned at some point in their
life, compared to one in 111 white women.109 Our system of
criminal hyperincarceration imposes permanent disadvantage on
people involved in it and stigmatizes all young black men as
potential law-breakers.10  As a result, we tolerate
hyper-surveillance of young black men.
It is far from clear that the demographics of incarcerated people
accurately reflect who actually commits crime. Commentators point
to the role of "conscious and unconscious racial discrimination" in law
enforcement and sentencing practices."' The 2015 U.S. Department
Crenshaw cautions against a male-centric view of the problem of hyperincarceration. See
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration, supra note 54, at 1422-
24; see also Allison S. Hartry, Gendering Crimmigration: The Intersection of Gender,
Immigration, and the Criminal Justice System, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1, 14
(2012) ("Immigration and crime are both often examined as male issues . . .. "). The
population of incarcerated women increased 10.9% between mid-2010 and 2013, while the
population of men fell by 4.2%. MINTON, supra note 104. A study found that most women
who had been convicted of felony drug offenses had no priors, their crimes were for small
amounts of drugs, and that they used drugs to cope with having been physically and
sexually abused. Gwen Rubinstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing-Denial of
Benefits to Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 98, at 37, 40. Government
surveys have documented that over half of female state prisoners report prior sexual or
physical abuse. Meda Chesney-Lind, Imprisoning Women: The Unintended Victims of Mass
Imprisonment, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 98, at 79, 83.
109. Racial Disparity, SENTENCING PROJECT tbl. 1, http://www.sentencingproject.org/
template/page.cfm?id=122 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
110. See Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 678 (1998)
(clarifying that "the disproportionate involvement of minorities (African Americans in
particular) in the criminal justice system generally stigmatizes all minorities, whether they
are categorized as law breakers or law abiders"). African American men are given the
binary choice of being a criminal or not. Randall Kennedy has described the phenomenon
of requiring more of Blacks than Whites to be accepted into society a "racial tax." KENNEDY,
supra note 32, at 158-59.
111. Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236,
2240 n.9 (2013); see also DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (1999) (arguing that there are two criminal justice systems, one for
the rich and one for the poor); ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5, 16-17, 21-41 (1997) (observing that "the consideration of class- and
race-neutral factors in the prosecutorial process often produced disparate results among race
and class lines"); Irene V. Blair, Charles M. Judd & Kristine M. Chapleau, The Influence of
Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 674,678 (2004) (describing
how inmates with more Afrocentric features received harsher sentences than those with less
Afrocentric features); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived
Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes 17 PSYCHOL. SCI.
383, 385 & fig. 2 (2006) (finding that the more stereotypically Black features possessed by a
criminal defendant the longer the sentence given by judges and that the chance of a death
sentence, particularly in cases involving white victims, more than doubles); Randall Kennedy,
Race and the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States, in CRIME AND PUBLIC
POLICY 237, 244-51 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011) (discussing the presence of
racial discrimination in determining sentencing and punishment); David B. Mustard, Racial,
Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J. L. &
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of Justice report on the Ferguson Police Department after the 2014
shooting death of Michael Brown "revealed a pattern or practice of
unlawful conduct," including "clear racial disparities."112 According
to statistics, "African Americans are more likely to be cited and
arrested following a stop regardless of why the stop was initiated and
are more likely to receive multiple citations during a single
incident."113 Racial profiling is also prevalent in immigration
enforcement.114
White-collar crime, committed disproportionately by white
people, is under-enforced in comparison to street crime.115 When
enforcing drug laws, police often bypass college campuses and
wealthy neighborhoods."6
ECON. 285, 301, 312 (2001) ("Income had a significant impact on the sentence length.... Blacks
and males not only receive longer sentences but also are less likely to receive no prison term
when that option is available."); Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit
Racial Bias on the Exercise ofProsecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 795,806, 824 (2012)
(examining how and when implicit bias affects prosecutorial decision-making and designing
ways to reduce these biases); Sara Steen, Rodney L. Engen & Randy R. Gainey, Images ofDanger
and Culpability: Racial Stereotyping, Case Processing, and Criminal Sentencing, 43
CRIMINOLOGY 435, 436 (2005) (observing that "linking race-ethnicity to criminality results in
more punitive treatment of minority defendants than white defendants"); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes to Convicting the Innocent: The Informants
Example, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2008) ("[S]ubconscious racial biases lead decision
makers ... in the processing of a criminal case to view racial minorities, especially African-
Americans, as more dangerous and less credible than whites.").
112. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT
1-2 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opalpress-releases/attachments/2015
/03/04/ferguson-police-departmentjreport.pdf.
113. Id. at 4. The report found that the Ferguson police department "appears to bring
certain offenses almost exclusively against African Americans. For example, from 2011 to
2013, African Americans accounted for 95% of Manner of Walking Roadway charges, and
94% of all Failure to Comply charges." Id. Moreover, "[n]early 90% of documented force
used by FPD officers was used against African Americans." Id. at 5. The investigations
further found "substantial evidence of racial bias among police and court staff in Ferguson,"
including "emails circulated by police supervisors and court staff that stereotype racial
minorities as criminals." Id. One of these emails "joked about an abortion by an African-
American woman as being a means of crime control." Id.
114. LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, RESTORING A NATIONAL CONSENSUS: THE NEED TO
END RACIAL PROFILING IN AMERICA 15-17 (2011), http://www.civilrights.org/publications
/reports/racial-profiling20ll/racial profiling2Oll.pdf; MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A.
KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS
TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 39 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homeseclR42057.pdf; Kevin
R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 675, 677-78 (2000); Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and
Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 606, 654 (2011); Daniel Robelo,
The Drug War-Mass Deportation: 250,000 Deported for Drug Offenses in Last 6 Years,
DRUG POL'Y ALLIANCE (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.drugpolicy.orgfblog/drug-war
-mass-deportation-250000-deported-drug-offenses-last-6-years.
115. ROBERT J. BRYM & JOHN LIE, SOCIOLOGY: POP CULTURE TO SOCIAL STRUCTURE
100 (3d ed. 2013).
116. Cf. Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by Design: The War on Drugs,
Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 73 SOC. RES. 445, 451 (2006)
(explaining how disadvantaged, poor neighborhoods are one of police enforcement's easy
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The conditions of many of our nation's jails and prisons
impose lasting harm.117 Long criminal sentences without
rehabilitation result in the warehousing of people in what may be
a breeding ground for criminality. 118 When incarcerated people are
released, we shun them and create obstacles to their reentry into
society. They remain outcasts as they become trapped in a web of
restrictions that preclude their reintegration, leading to
"perpetual punishment."19 Formerly incarcerated people cannot
qualify for certain types of jobs or licenses or obtain some types of
federal entitlements, housing, and student loans.120 People
deemed sexual offenders might have no place to live due to
post-release living restrictions.121 The disenfranchisement of
targets to show progress on the "War on Drugs"); Tracey Meares, Place and Crime, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 699 (1998) (discussing strict enforcement of certain laws in poor
neighborhoods but arguing that this not a rational basis for objecting to the laws).
117. See Richard D. Nobleman, Wilson v. Seiter: Prison Conditions and the Eighth
Amendment Standard, 24 PAC. L.J. 275, 276 (1992) ("As of January 1, 1990, forty-one states
and the District of Columbia had some or all of their prisons operating under court order
due to unconstitutional conditions of confinement."). The U.S. Supreme Court recently held
that California's prison system violates the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel
and unusual punishment, ordering the state to reduce its population by a third. See Brown
v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922, 1944, 1947 (2011). California's prisons were rated for 79,858
people but were holding 143,000 at the time of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision. A SECOND
CHANCE, supra note 83.
118. Alexander, supra note 100, at 237; see also Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison
Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1089, 1092-93 (concluding that "we may now
be at or near a tipping point where prison is causing a net increase in crime").
119. A SECOND CHANCE, supra note 83, at 8.
120. Jeremy Travis has described this phenomenon as the experience that "one's
debt to society is never paid" and notes "[o]thers liken [the stigma of being a
criminal] to 'the mark of Cain."' Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument
of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 98, at 15, 19-20. Federal
law permits states to deny food stamps and other federal entitlements to people
convicted of a drug felony. 21 U.S.C. § 862(a) (2012). People with certain drug and
other convictions can be denied Section 8 housing. 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a). More than
90% of jobs require a background check. A SECOND CHANCE, supra note 83, at 16.
Only about 50% of formerly incarcerated people are able to find work within a year
of being released from jail or prison. Id. at 8 (citing Steven Greenhouse, States Help
Ex-Inmates Find Jobs, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 24, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/business/25offender.html?_r=0). For a long list
of collateral consequences of crimes, which number in the hundreds, see the ABA
National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, ABA COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES, http://abacollateralconsequences.org/map/ (last visited Feb. 6,
2016).
121. See Exile v. Miami-Dade Cty., 35 So. 3d 118 (Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (describing an
unsuccessful challenge of a municipal code provision that forbade sexual offenders from
living within 2500 feet of a school, even though a less restrictive state statute set a 1000
feet restriction); see also Greg Allen, Sex Offenders Forced to Live Under Miami Bridge,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 20, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=
104150499 (describing the growing encampment of tents, which-as a result of the local
ordinance prohibiting their residence within 2500 feet of a location where children gather-
may be the only option for sex offenders who want to reside in Miami).
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people with felony convictions carries its own set of harms and
may even have resulted in Al Gore losing the 2000 presidential
election. 122
Hyperincarceration also inflicts collateral consequences on
the families and communities of those incarcerated.123 Prisons are
often built far from population centers, placing formidable
roadblocks in the way of family members trying to maintain
relationships.12 4 Phone calls are prohibitively expensive.125 One in
fourteen black children has a parent who is incarcerated.
126
122. Approximately 6 million U.S. citizens cannot vote or run for office because they
have been convicted of a felony. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, SARAH SHANNON & JEFF MANZA,
SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2010, at 1 (2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications
/fdStateLevelEstimates-ofFelonDisen 2010.pdf. In Florida, more than 10% of people
eligible to vote are disenfranchised. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 45, at 245. According to
sociologists Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza, the 2000 presidential election in Florida
was so close that "it would almost certainly have been reversed had voting rights been
extended to any category of disenfranchised felons." Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza,
Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United
States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 792 (2002), http://www.asanet.org/images/members/
docs/pdf/featured/uggen.pdf. Studies demonstrate that people who vote after being released
from jail or prison are less likely to reoffend. A SECOND CHANCE, supra note 83, at 19 (citing
FLA. PAROLE COMM'N, STATUS UPDATE: RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS CASES GRANTED
2009 AND 2010, at 12-13 (2011)).
123. See generally TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES 9-10 (2007). See also
Roberts, supra note 79, at 1009 (explaining that incarceration results in disproportionate
economic instability and separation of black families).
124. SARAH LAWRENCE & JEREMY TRAVIS, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR.,
THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF IMPRISONMENT: MAPPING AMERICA'S PRISON EXPANSION 33
(2004), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410994_mapping-prisons.pdf; see also
Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, Introduction, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra
note 98, at 1, 6 ("In New York State, forty of the forty-one new prisons built since
1983 have been located in rural upstate communities." (citing LISA FREEMAN &
ROBERT GANGI, FOLLOWING THE DOLLARS: WHERE NEW YORK STATE SPENDS ITS
PRISON MONEY, CITY PROJECT 4 (2000))); PRISON COMMUNITIES: FROM Low-INCOME
URBAN TO LOW-INCOME RURAL-AND BACK, ADLER SCH., INST. ON PUB. SAFETY &
SOC. JUSTICE, ILL. COAL. FOR IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RIGHTS (2012),
http://www.adler.edu/resources/content/4/1/documents/AdlerWhite-PaperIPSSJ-
ICIRRPrison-CommunitiesFINAL.pdf.
125. The Leadership Conference Education Fund calls the high prison phone
rates "predatory." A SECOND CHANCE, supra note 83, at 4. The Fund notes that
"regulatory agencies ... have tended to turn a blind eye to the high prices charged
to incarcerated people" because "[flor every dollar spent by incarcerated people on
phone calls, the companies give a payment to the correctional system or the local
sheriffs department." Id. at 9. These payments can be as much as 50%. Id. On
February 11, 2014, new Federal Communications Commission regulations governing
interstate calls went into effect, capping the rate for prison phone rates at 25 cents
per minute for collect calls and 21 cents per minute for debit or pre-paid calls.
INMATE TELEPHONE SERVICE, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, www.fec.gov/guides/inmate-
telephone-service (last visited Feb. 6, 2016). The new rate caps do not affect rates
for intrastate calls, however. Id.
126. Mauer & Chesney-Lind, supra note 124, at 1, 4. One in ten children has had an
incarcerated parent. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 45, at 1.
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Children with a parent behind bars are more likely than their
peers to be impoverished, put into foster care, and arrested
themselves.127 The effects include financial and emotional impact
from severed relationships, resulting in "reshaping family and
community across generations" such that "social bonds" are
"corro[ded]."128 Although women make up a much smaller
percentage of our prison population, they may disproportionately
suffer the consequences of hyperincarceration.129 Two thirds of
incarcerated women have at least one minor child.130 Locking up
so many men, particularly black men, has distorted the male-
female ratio, resulting in a shortage of heterosexual black men and
distorting the allocation of power in male-female intimate
relationships. 131
Communities suffer from large numbers of their members
cycling in and out of prison.132 Removing large numbers of
people from communities that already suffer from high levels
of incarceration causes residential destabilization that may
result in increased crime.133 Data tracking vital statistics like
poverty, employment, and health are distorted because the
imprisoned population is not counted.134 Hyperincarceration
may also lead to the under-deterrence of crime because people
127. A SECOND CHANCE, supra note 83, at 6 (citing Statistics Concerning Children of
Prisoners, DEMOSS (2015), http://demoss.com/newsrooms/atfbackground/statistics
-concerning-children-of-prisoners; CRENIE F. HAIRSTON, PRISONERS AND FAMILIES:
PARENTING ISSUES DURING INCARCERATION 4 (2001)).
128. Donald Braman, Families and Incarceration, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra
note 98, at 117, 118, 135. For a discussion of the collateral costs of incarceration on
imprisoned people, their families, and their communities, see John Hagan & Ronit
Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and.
Prisoners, 26 CRIME & JUST. 121, 122-23 (1999).
129. Beth E. Richie, The Social Impact of Mass Incarceration on Women, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT, supra note 98, at 136, 136-49.
130. Mauer & Chesney-Lind, supra note 124, at 1, 4.
131. Braman, supra note 128, at 128 (discussing the problem of "male
shortage" and how women must "lower their standards to find a man to date or
marry").
132. Todd Clear et al., Coercive Mobility and Crime: Incarceration and Social
Disorganization, 20 JUST. Q. 56, 58 (2003). Donald Braman concludes from a study of the
effects of incarceration levels on the District of Columbia that "the dramatic increase in the
use of incarceration over the last two decades has in many ways missed its mark, injuring
the families of prisoners often as much as and sometimes more than criminal offenders
themselves." Braman, supra note 128, at 117.
133. Todd R. Clear, The Problem with "Addition by Subtraction" The Prison-Crime
Relationship in Low-Income Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 98, at 181,
182-83 (explaining that "the effects of imprisonment undermine the building blocks of
social order" creating "a kind of double whammy" when people are removed from the
community and then return). For a discussion of the neighborhood level causes of crime,
see infra notes 253-59 and accompanying text.
134. GOTISCHALK, supra note 45, at 242.
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believe there is no escape from it.136 By calling into question
the legitimacy of law enforcement, hyperincarceration may
even undermine allegiance to the law by those who are
committed to it.136
Many of the harms of criminal incarceration parallel those
caused by civil immigration detention and deportation.
Immigration detention and deportation separates people from
their families, communities, and support networks.137 Our nation
loses workers and parents, placing children at increased risk of
poverty, poor school performance, and foster care.138 Most
individuals deported on account of a criminal history have been in
the United States for a long period of time and many have multiple
and deep ties to the United States.139 The impact of deportation of
a parent on children left behind is well documented. Children
suffer from long-term effects such as anxiety, depression, and
decreased school performance.140 At least 5,100 children are in
135. As Randall Kennedy has noted, Blacks are the primary victims of crime.
KENNEDY, supra note 32, at 17, 158. To critique hyperincarceration is not to argue
that crimes go unpunished, only that sanctions be reduced- and law enforcement
operate without bias. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 45, at 176-77 (observing that "the
certainty of punishment is a far greater deterrent to crime than the severity of
punishment"); see also Marie Gottschalk, Bring It on: The Future of Penal Reform,
the Carceral State, and American Politics, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559, 568 (2015)
(studies of mandatory sentencing regimes show they are not major deterrents to
crime).
136. Meares, supra note 110, at 678.
137. See SETH FREED WESSLER, APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE
PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
3 (2011) (stating the United States deported "397,000 people and detained nearly that
many... shatter[ing] families"); see also Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More
Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014),
http://www.nytimescom/2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows
.html?_r=0 (providing anecdotes that illustrate the disruption deportations cause on
communities, support systems, and family units).
138. AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL., FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE AFTERMATH OF
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 27, 51 (2010); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JAILING REFUGEES:
ARBITRARY DETENTION OF REFUGEES IN THE U.S. WHO FAIL TO ADJUST TO PERMANENT
RESIDENT STATUS 36 (2009); WESSLER, supra note 137, at 4; Kalina Brabeck & Qingwen
Xu, The Impact of Detention and Deportation on Latino Immigrant Children and Families:
A Quantitative Exploration, 32 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 341, 352-53 (2010).
139. Beth Caldwell, Excluding 'Criminals' from Comprehensive Immigration Reform,
UNHCR (May 13, 2013), http://www.unhcrorg/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fe6fbd5&
id=5191cb785; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Border Enforcement Policies Ensnare
Parents of US Citizen Children, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/08/border-enforcement
-policies-ensnare-parents-us-citizen-children (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (reporting that 24%
of "criminal aliens" had illegal entry or similar crimes as their most serious offense and
that one in five immigrants charged with the crime of illegal entry or re-entry stated their
child was a U.S. citizen).
140. BAUM ET AL., supra note 7, at 5, 9; Kalina M. Brabeck et al., The Psychosocial
Impact of Detention and Deportation on U.S. Migrant Children and Families, 84 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 497-98 (2014) (summarizing research in this area); Robert T. Muller,
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foster care due to the deportation of at least one parent. 141 Society
at large must bear the lasting costs of this family separation.
The conditions of immigration detention are often abysmal.142
Immigrants are held in jails and jail-like facilities, often in remote
areas of the country, isolated from their families, lawyers, and
support networks.143 Unlike people accused of a crime, people in
immigration proceedings are not entitled to a lawyer at
government expense. Having a lawyer significantly increases a
noncitizen's chances of prevailing in court.144 Detainees lack
The Traumatic Effects of Forced Deportation on Families, PSYCHOL. TODAY (2013),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/talking-about-trauma/201305/the-traumatic-effects
-forced-deportation-families.
141. WESSLER, supra note 137, at 23. An estimated additional 15,000 children in the
next five years "will face these threats to reunification with their detained and deported
mothers and fathers." Id.; see also Trang Bui, Battle Scars from the Fight Between Family
Law and Immigration Law: Incarcerated Immigrant Parents and Missouri's Response, 81
UMKC L. REV. 183, 186 (2012) (concluding that the estimated total number of children in
foster care is much higher than 5,100).
142. DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4
(2009); Lara Yoder Nafziger, Protection or Persecution?: The Detention of Unaccompanied
Immigrant Children in the United States, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 357, 379-85 (2006);
Dora Schriro, Improving Conditions of Confinement for Criminal Inmates and Immigrant
Detainees, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1442, 1446-47, 1449-51 (2011); Gwynne Skinner,
Bringing International Law to Bear on the Detention of Refugees in the United States, 16
WILLAMETTEJ. INT'LL. & DISP. RESOL. 270,294-95 (2008); Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens
Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1113-26 (1995); Note, Improving the Carceral Conditions ofFederal
Immigrant Detainees, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1476, 1476, 1479-81 (2012); Kelsey E. Papst, Note,
Protecting the Voiceless: Ensuring ICE's Compliance with Standards that Protect Immigration
Detainees, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 261, 276-80 (2009).
143. DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE AND CLOSE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1, 3
(2012), http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files
/expose-executivenovl2.pdf; see also AMNESTY INT'L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE:
IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 30 (2009), http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs
/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf.
144. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafter, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 49 (2015) (reporting the results of a study that found
"representation was associated with a nineteen to forty-three percentage point boost in rate of
case successes"); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Phillip G. Schrag, Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007) (observing that a
lawyer increases an asylum applicant's chances of winning by a factor of three); THE STUDY
GROUP ON IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, ACCESSING JUSTICE II: A MODEL FOR PROVIDING
COUNSEL TO NEW YORK IMMIGRANTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 1, 11-12 (2012) (noting that
immigrants facing deportation in New York immigration courts with a lawyer are 500% as likely
to win their cases as those without representation; detained immigrants in New York
immigration courts are unrepresented in 78% of deportation cases); see also EXEC. OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2014 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (2015),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/1 (finding that 45% of
all persons facing removal proceedings did so without counsel); THE N. CAL. COLLABORATIVE FOR
IMMIGRANT JUSTICE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR IMMIGRANT FAMmIS AND COMMUNITIES 9 (2014),
http://www.1ccr.com/wp-content/uploads/NCCIJ-Access-to-Justice-ReportOct.-2014.pdf (roughly
two-thirds of detained immigrants had no legal representation at any point in their removal
proceedings).
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adequate access to self-help legal materials and other services.145
Jailers impose prohibitive rates on phone calls and restrict family
visitation time.146 Reports of substandard medical care are
commonplace.147 Since 2003, 141 people have died while in
immigration detention.148 The harms of our harsh deportation
145. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 143, at 32; APPLESEED, ASSEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE:
BLUEPRINT TO REFORM AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION COURTS 29 (2009), http://applese
ednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Assembly-Line-Injustice-Blueprint-to-Reform
-Americas-Immigration-Courts 1.pdf; Steven Neeley, Immigration Detention: The Inaction
of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 729, 736-37
(2008); see also COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR ASSOC., REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 5-10 (2010) ("[M]any
unrepresented noncitizens in the immigration system are unable to determine what, if any,
relief is available to them or to otherwise navigate our immigration adjudication system
effectively.").
146. Phone Justice for Immigrants in Detention, NATION INSIDE, http://nation
inside.org/campaignlendisolation/facts/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (detailing the high cost of
calls from detention centers); see, e.g., RUBEN LOYO & CAROLYN CORRADO, IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS CLINIC, LOCKED UP BUT NOT FORGOTTEN: OPENING ACCESS TO FAMILY AND
COMMUNITY IN THE IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM 23 (2010) (documenting prohibitively
high rates for phone calls at ICE contract facilities in and near New York). The February
2014 Federal Communications Commission caps on interstate calls will apply to facilities
that detain people for immigration authorities. See A SECOND CHANCE supra note 83. The
caps, however, do not apply to intrastate calls. Some detention facilities only permit video
visits between detainees and their family members. DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, supra
note 143. A Government Accounting Office report found chronic problems with immigration
detention center phone systems. See Michelle Brand & Christiana Lundholm, Human
Rights Behind Bars: Advancing the Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States
Through Human Rights Frameworks, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 159-60 (2008) (citing GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-875, ALIEN DETENTION STANDARDS: TELEPHONE ACCESS
PROBLEMS WERE PERVASIVE AT DETENTION FACILITIES 1 (2007),
http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsl d07875.pdf).
147. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, U.S.: IMMIGRATION DETENTION NEGLECTS HEALTH
(2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/03/17/us-immigration-detention-neglects-health
(describing detention facilities' failure to provide basic health care to women with medical
issues). U.S. Representative Zoe Lofgren, chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law, stated that
the Washington Post obtained a document that "lists the amount of money ICE saved by
denying requests for treatment . .. for such things as tuberculosis, pneumonia, bone
fractures, head trauma, chest pain, and other serious complaints." Problems with
Immigration Detainee Medical Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & Int'l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 3-4 (2008) (statement of Rep. Lofgren, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg42722/html/CHRG-110hhrg42722.htm; see
also Improving the Carceral Conditions of Federal Immigrant Detainees, supra note 142, at
1476 ("[R]ecent federal immigration policy has led to widespread maltreatment of federal
immigrant detainees."); Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory
Immigration Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 602-03, 622 (2010) (describing
examples of poor medical care during prolonged immigration detention resulting in serious
health problems for immigrants).
148. LIST OF DEATHS IN ICE CUSTODY: OCTOBER 2003-DECEMBER 2, 2013,
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/reports/detaineedeaths2003-present.pdf. See generally
Kate Bowles, Is the Doctor In? The Contemptible Condition of Immigrant Detainee
Healthcare in the U.S. and the Need for a Constitutional Remedy, 31 J. NAT'L AsS'N
20161 "IMMIGRANTS ARE NOT CRIMINALS" 725
system extend beyond our borders, generating externalities for
sending countries. The deportation of people 'With criminal
convictions shifts the burden of post-jail reintegration to other
countries, often countries less well positioned than the United
States to cope with people making this transition.149 If criminal
behaviors by immigrants were largely imported, such a focus
might make sense. But the majority of immigrants who have
criminal records began their offending behavior only after having
lived in the United States.150
At the most fundamental level, criminal and civil
hyperincarceration intensifies the divides between classes of
people, including along racial, ethnic, and class lines.151 As Marie
Gottschalk has observed, "The carceral state has helped to
legitimize the idea of creating a highly distinct political and legal
universe for numerous categories of people."152 The Leadership
Conference Education Fund has concluded that "the economic and
political marginalization of formerly incarcerated people now
stand[s] as among our era's most critical civil and human rights
concerns" and "come[s] with distinct racial and economic justice
implications."153 Mass criminal and civil incarceration is not a
sustainable approach to societal control and stands in tension with
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 169 (2011) (describing deaths of immigration detainees and
arguing for better medical treatment); Lisa A. Cahan, Constitutional Protections of
Aliens: A Call For Action To Provide Adequate Health Care For Immigration Detainees,
3 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 343 (2007) (reporting about immigration detainee deaths
and advocating for improvements in the medical care of people in immigration
detention).
149. Alejandro Portes has documented how U.S. attempts to control the flow of
unauthorized migration across its border leads to permanent settlement of immigrants and
an increased risk that their children will assimilate "downward" as a reaction to "hostility
and limited opportunity" and engage in criminal activity that results in deportation. Upon
return to their home country, these young people "transfer deviant styles of life learned
abroad to their home communities." Alejandro Portes, Migration, Development, and
Segmented Assimilation: A Conceptual Review of the Evidence, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. ScI. 73, 73 (2007); see also M. Kathleen Dingeman & Ruben G. Rumbaut, The
Immigration-Crime Nexus and Post-Deportation Experiences: En/countering Stereotypes in
Southern California and El Salvador, 31 U. LA. VERNE L. REV. 363, 394 (2010) ("Migration
scholars have frequently observed that voluntary and forced-return migrants often
experience prejudice and discrimination in their home societies." (citing Jean-Pierre
Cassarino, Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants
Revisited, 6 INT'L J. MULTICULTURAL SOC'Y 253, 262, 264 (2004); Ruerd Ruben et al., What
Determines the Embeddedness of Forced-Return Migrants? Rethinking the Role of Pre- and
Post-Return Assistance, 43 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 908, 912-13 (2009))).
150. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
151. See GARLAND, supra note 29, at 204 ("[A] reliance upon penal mechanisms"
results in "hardening of social and racial divisions, the reinforcement of criminogenic
processes; the alienation of large social groups; the discrediting of legal authority; a
reduction of civic tolerance; [and] a tendency towards authoritarianism ....
152. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 45, at 242.
153. A SECOND CHANCE, supra note 83, at 4.
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fundamental principles of democracy. This grim reality must
inform the critiques, messages, and strategies of immigration
reformers.
V. SCHOLARLY CRITIQUES
A rich and growing body of scholarship documents and
criticizes the myriad ways in which our criminal and immigration
enforcement systems have become intertwined, such that
immigration enforcement "appears to be the most recent iteration
of the war on crime."154 These "crimmigration" commentaries have
taken a variety of forms. Some trace the historical origins of the
rise in immigration detention, the militarization of immigration
enforcement, and the expansion of criminal grounds of removal,
relating these phenomena to the rise of the carceral state, racism
against Latinos, and our nation's increasing commitment to
neoliberalism.155 Others discuss the importance of membership
154. Jennifer M. Chac6n, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1602 (2010)
[hereinafter Chac6n, Diversion of Attention]. Literature in this area includes: Mary
Bosworth & Emma Kaufman, Foreigners in a Carceral Age: Immigration and Imprisonment
in the United States, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 429, 440-41 (2011); Jennifer M. Chac6n,
Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 137-39 (2009)
[hereinafter Chac6n, Managing Migration]; Jennifer M. Chac6n, Overcriminalizing
Immigration, 102 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 613, 614 (2012); Jennifer M. Chac6n,
Unsecured Borders, supra note 33, at 1827, 1830, 1843-44, 1846, 1848; Nora V. Demleitner,
Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the 'War" on
Terrorism?; 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1059 (2002); Ingrid Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104
Nw. U. L. REV. 1281, 1326-27, 1330-31 (2010); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the
Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th "Pale of Law", 29 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 639, 640 (2004) [hereinafter Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented];
Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About
Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1891 (2000) [hereinafter
Kanstroom, Deportation]; Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 471-72
(2007); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible
Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 113-21 (2012); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the
Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11, 25 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 81 (2005) [hereinafter Miller, Blurring the Boundaries]; Teresa A. Miller,
Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 619-20 (2003); Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis, supra note 76, at 376;
Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Immigration,
86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1591-94 (2008); Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal
Construction of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 63 (2010);
Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51
EMORY L.J. 1131, 1131, 1134-38 (2002); Yolanda Vizquez, Perpetuating the
Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the Incorporation of Immigration
Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639, 655-60 (2011).
155. See, e.g., Cbsar Cuauhtmoc Garcia HernAndez, Creating Crimmigration, 2013
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1515; Teresa A. Miller, A New Look at Neo-Liberal Economic Policies
and the Criminalization of Undocumented Migrants, 61 S.M.U. L. Rev. 171, 180-85 (2008)
(analyzing the connection between neoliberal economic policies and the criminalization of
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theory, demonstrating how criminal and immigration law have
become intertwined because they both involve questions of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, our society, as well as the
limitations of this approach.156 The rise of national security
discourse and legislation has prompted some commentators to
situate crimmigration in the "war on terror."157
This Part focuses on three claims of the crimmigration
commentary: immigrants have been converted into criminals
through the prosecution of behaviors associated with being
undocumented; civil immigration enforcement has become bound
up with criminal enforcement such that the institutional norms
and actors are often the same; and immigration enforcement has
focused on people with minor criminal histories. The analysis of
how immigrants have been inappropriately criminalized focuses
in part on how current enforcement and prosecutorial practices at
the state and federal level transform undocumented immigrants
into criminals and how the jail-to-deportation pipeline targets
low-level violators.16 8
A. Converting Immigrants into Criminals
At the state level, undocumented immigrants are precluded
from obtaining drivers licenses and are then prosecuted criminally
for driving without a license and related offenses, like possession
of false documents and identity theft. 159 Criminal traffic violations
account for 14% of offenses committed by people dubbed "criminal
immigrants); Yolanda VAzquez, Constructing Crimmigration, supra note 36, at 606
(arguing that racism explains why Latinos are "detained and removed from the United
States at exponentially higher rates than other racial groups" despite the fact that they "do
not commit 'dangerous' crimes nor pose a serious threat to national security").
156. See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 154, at 130-45; Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis,
supra note 76, at 377.
157. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 33, at 1855; Demleitner, supra note 154,
at 1059, 1062-63; Kanstroom Criminalizing the Undocumented, supra note 154; Miller,
Blurring the Boundaries, supra note 154, at 87-90; Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1577-79 (2002).
158. For a discussion of the literature in this area, see Chac6n, Managing Migration,
supra note 154, at 627-29, 635, 638-39 (describing increased immigration enforcement
efforts by both the federal and state governments). A related claim is that deportation now
constitutes punishment. See HernAndez, supra note 5, at 1356; Kanstroom, Deportation,
supra note 154, at 1892-94; Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1299, 1339, 1349-50 (2011); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as
Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must
Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 332-36 (2000). Relatedly, Anil Kalhan has argued that
"excessive immigration detention practices have evolved into a quasi-punitive system of
immcarceration." Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 42, 43 (2010).
159. See Chac6n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 33, at 1885-86.
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aliens."160 At the federal level, U.S. Attorney Offices have shifted
their prosecutorial priorities away from drug enforcement and
toward the prosecution of criminal immigration violations, like
illegal entry and reentry.161 Expedited removal-the deportation
of arriving or recently arrived noncitizens by low-level
immigration officials rather than immigration judges-increased
the number of people subject to criminal prosecution upon reentry.
The expedited removal statute was enacted in 1996 and expanded
twice in 2004 and 2006, such that it now covers individuals
apprehended within 100 miles of the border.162 In 2013,
approximately 193,032 people were ordered removed under this
procedure, accounting for 44% of all removals.163 As a result of the
skyrocketing number of people with prior removal orders, many
people caught reentering the United States are now criminally
prosecuted for illegal reentry. In 2006, almost 26% of all federal
prosecutions were related to illegal reentry and other types of
immigration violations. That number rose to 49.9% by 2012.164
After being convicted, these individuals are turned over to
immigration authorities for detention and deportation as
"criminal aliens."165
B. Institutional Entanglement
The criminalization critique also demonstrates how our criminal
and immigration systems of enforcement and incarceration have
become enmeshed in numerous respects. Immigration and criminal
law enforcement authorities have constructed a vast
jail-to-deportation pipeline. Local police participate in immigration
enforcement by engaging in joint enforcement operations; forwarding
fingerprints and other information to federal authorities; detaining
immigrants suspected of immigration violations, either lawfully
160. CRIMINAL ALIEN STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 21.
161. Michael T. Light, Mark Hugo Lopez & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, The Rise ofFederal
Immigration Crimes: Unlawful Reentry Drives Growth, PEW RES. CTR.: HiSP. TRENDS (Mar.
18, 2014), http://pewhispanic.org/2014/03/18/the-rise-of-federal-immigration-crimes/
(noting that between 1992 and 2012, "the number of unlawful reentry convictions increased
28-fold" while the overall number of "offenders sentenced in federal courts more than
doubled").
162. Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. C.R.
& C.L. 165, 173 (2007).
163. SIMANSKI, supra note 17, at 5.
164. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248470, FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 2012, at 4 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdflfsl2st.pdf; U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, ILLEGAL REENTRY OFFENSES 1 (2015), http://ussc.gov/sites/default
/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/immigration/2015 Illeg
al-Reentry-Report.pdf.
165. See Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF'T, http://www.ice.gov/ero (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
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(when they have been deputized to act as federal immigration
officers) or unlawfully (if they act without authority); and, in some
jurisdictions, prolonging the detention of noncitizens in criminal
custody so that immigration officers can pick them up.166 The ways
in which the lines have blurred between immigration and criminal
enforcement is evident from the following candid statement of a high
level ICE officer: "If you don't have enough evidence to charge
someone criminally but you think he's illegal, we [ICE] can make him
disappear."167 Some noncitizens are deported while still serving their
sentences and others are deported without ever having seen a
judge.168 Those entitled to a hearing before a judge are often held in
mandatory detention, even if bond was available in the underlying
criminal case.69 Only recently have courts begun to place restraints
on the length of time that immigration authorities can hold
noncitizens while they are fighting their cases.170
166. Several federal aw enforcement programs have targeted noncitizens in the criminal
justice system, including Secure Communities, the Criminal Alien Program, and Priority
Enforcement Program. See Criminal Alien Program, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF'T, https://ice.gov/criminal-alien-program (last visited Feb. 6,
2016); Secure Communities, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENF'T, http://ice.gov/securecommunities#tab1 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016); Statement from U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Director Sarah R. Saldafia, U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF'T (Mar. 20, 2015),
https://ice.gov/news/releases/statement-us-immigration-and-customs-enforcement-ice-director-
saldana; see also Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149,203-07.(2013)
(discussing history of immigration detainers). See generally Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)voluing
Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259,
1266--68, 1271-72, 1281 (2015) (describing the rise and fall of Secure Communities and its
replacement with the Priority Enforcement Program). Local and state officers lack authority to
enforce civil immigration law unless deputized under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). See Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506-07, 2532-33 (2012) (holding that state officers cannot make a
"unilateral decision. . . to arrest an alien for being removable").
167. The quote is from James Pendergraph when he was executive director of ICE's
Office of State and Local Coordination. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 143, at 4 (quoting
James Pendergraph, speaking at the Police Foundation National Conference, The Role of
Local Police: Striking a Balance Between Immigration Enforcement and Civil Liberties,
Washington, D.C.); see also DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 22-35 (2003) (discussing how law
enforcement authorities after 9/11 targeted Muslim noncitizens alleging visa violations as
a proxy for national security grounds).
168. Administrative removal permits immigration enforcement authorities to deport
without a hearing a person who is not a lawful permanent resident if they believe that the
noncitizen has an aggravated felony conviction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (2012); ROSENBLUM
& KANDEL, supra note 114, at 14-15.
169. Under § 1226(c), the "Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who" is
inadmissible pursuant to any criminal ground or deportable pursuant on most criminal
grounds "when the alien is released." 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). The federal government takes
the position that this provision authorizes prolonged detention without a bond hearing. See
generally Anello, supra note 89 (discussing case law about the permissible length of
detention of noncitizens).
170. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding
that § 1226(c) should be interpreted as implicitly containing a reasonable time limitation);
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
C. Deportation for Minor Crimes
A high percentage of people caught up in the
jail-to-deportation pipeline were convicted of only relatively minor
crimes.171 Analyzing government statistics, Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse concluded that convictions "for the petty
offense of illegal entry continue to dominate the criminal
enforcement of federal immigration laws," finding that during "the
first six months of fiscal year 2014, . . . two out of three
immigration convictions ... were for this offense."172 In the
ten-year period from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2013, illegal
entry convictions accounted for 65% of all immigration-related
convictions.173 As mentioned above, state and local criminal traffic
offenses accounted for 14% of the crimes of "criminal aliens."74
ICE reports that, in 2014, roughly half of the convicted noncitizens
who were deported were Level 2 (one felony or three or more
misdemeanors) or Level 3 (one misdemeanor) offenders, and about
half of this group had only been convicted of a single
misdemeanor.'75
These insights about how immigrants have been criminalized
are integral to understanding how U.S. policy decisions have
created criminals out of people who were previously civil law
violators, how immigration enforcement policies target low-level
criminal law violators, and how our civil and immigration systems
Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[T]he statute implicitly
authorizes detention for a reasonable amount of time, after which the authorities must
make an individualized inquiry into whether detention is still necessary. . ."); Ly v.
Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 269-70 (6th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that a reasonable time limitation
abides by constitutional requirements and Congress's intent).
171. According to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, in 2013 "only 12
percent of all deportees [apprehended through the Secure Communities program] had been
found to have committed a serious or 'Level 1' offense" based on ICE definitions. Secure
Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://trac.syr.edulimmigration/reports/349/.
172. Despite Rise in Felony Charges, Most Immigration Convictions Remain
Misdemeanors, TRAC IMMIGRATION (June 26, 2014) (citation omitted), http://trac.syr.edu
/immigration/reports/356/.
173. Id.
174. CRIMINAL ALIEN STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 21.
175. ICE reported that 43,897 of the convicted criminals removed were Level 1
offenders, 22,191 were Level 2 offenders, and 20,835 were Level 3 offenders. U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT: FISCAL YEAR
2014, at 10 (2014), https://ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdfl2014-ice-immigration
-removals.pdf. Level 2 offenders include any person convicted of a felony or three or more
misdemeanors and Level 3 offenders include any person convicted of any crime punishable
by less than a year imprisonment. MICHELE WASLIN, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ICE's
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have become entangled. At the same time, the critique risks being
understood as a claim to respectability, namely that it is unjust to
treat civil law violators and minor criminal law violators as if they
were real criminals. A narrow focus on how immigrants have been
criminalized could be interpreted as endorsing the claim that law
enforcement's only mistake is applying this label to undocumented
immigrants and low-level violators-a view that reinforces the
categories of "criminal" and "criminal alien" and the stigma
associated with them. As with mainstream reform efforts, a
limited criminalization critique could be understood as accepting
that immigration enforcement can be tethered to crime control (as
long as it has the right focus) and leaving unchallenged the edifice
of the carceral state.
Broader criminalization critiques have analyzed the
relationship between criminal and immigration enforcement and
structural features of our society, including racial and class
inequalities. U.S. policy choices are responsible for increasing the
number of convicted noncitizens.176 As Yolanda VAzquez has
pointed out, the "United States' prosecution and removal of
individuals is derived from political choices and cultural norms,"
and these choices and norms are used "to enforce racial
hierarchies."'7 7 Similarly, C6sar Cuauhtimoc Garcia Herndndez
has observed that the "markers of potential undesirability are no
different than those we have used for decades to build the mass
shadow world of penal imprisonment-race and class."7 8 The
insight that racialized policy choices construct crime, detention,
and deportation rates, together with an analysis of how social and
economic inequality leads to crime and unauthorized migration,
suggests a more inclusive framework for immigration reform.
VI. AN ALTERNATE FRAME
An alternate vision for immigrant julstice reflects an
understanding of how racial and class inequalities and U.S. policy
choices drive mass criminal and immigration incarceration and
shape behavior that results in crime and unauthorized migration.
In this view, immigrant justice is inexorably linked to the racial
justice movement to dismantle the carceral state.'79 The contrast
between immigrants and criminals (and between the immigration
and criminal systems) falls away as an organizing and rhetorical
176. See Chac6n, Diversion of Attention, supra note 154, at 1575 & n.50; Chac6n,
Unsecured Borders, supra note 33, at 1885-86.
177. Vdzquez, Constructing Crimmigration, supra note 36, at 606.
178. Garcia Herndndez, supra note 25, at 359.
179. Some reformers and advocates already take this approach. See supra Part IV.
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device and immigration enforcement is delinked from crime
control. Every iteration of the distinction between immigrants and
criminals and between minor and major criminals is understood
as distancing the immigrant rights movement from the racial
justice movement to end hyperincarceration and furthering the
harms of our carceral nation.
A. The Salience of Race
The racial justice critique of hyperincarceration suggests a
framework for immigration reform that moves beyond seeking
gains for respectable immigrants. The movement for racial justice,
unlike the mainstream movement for immigration reform, has
made significant headway in moving beyond respectability politics
and the focus on middle class issues. In particular, Michelle
Alexander's The New Jim Crow has helped to popularize the
movement against criminal hyperincarceration.o80 Shifting the
focus away from narratives involving respectable black people,
Alexander has put forth a compelling account of how it has come
to be that one-third of young black men will likely be jailed in their
lifetime. She describes a trajectory from slavery to Jim Crow to
hyperincarceration, locating the origin of hyperincarceration in
the post-Reconstruction strategy of white elites to drive a wedge
between poor Blacks and Whites. Alexander makes a powerful
case for how our nation's system of incarceration has instituted a
racialized caste system that appears colorblind.181 Although our
society largely rejects overt racism, she argues, we are still
permitted to "hate criminals."182
180. ALEXANDER, supra note 100, at 217-24.
181. Id. at 57-58. Others have made similar claims. See, e.g., Mauer & Chesney-Lind,
supra note 124, at 1, 5 ("[I]t is understood that crime has become a code word for race in
American political life, and therefore 'tough' talk on crime is a proxy for criminal justice
policies that disproportionately control and police African-American communities.");
Brooks Berndt, Ritual and Racism: A Social-Historical Analysis of the Crack Sentencing
Guidelines, 39 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 175, 177 (2003) (noting how the practice of
demonizing and imprisoning black people has reinserted them back into the economic order
as slaves); see also MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 167-70 (1995) (discussing the detrimental cultural effects stemming from the
arrest and imprisonment of African Americans); Carroll Seron & Frank Munger, Law and
Inequality: Race, Gender ... and, of Course, Class, 22 ANN. REV. SOC. 187, 207 (1996)
(emphasizing the continuing importance of class and its potential use in contemporary
sociolegal research). The link between slavery and criminals was expressly present in the
Thirteenth Amendment, which outlawed slavery but sanctioned it for those convicted of a
crime. See Spearlt, Legal Punishment as Civil Ritual: Making Cultural Sense of Harsh
Punishment, 82 MISS. L.J. 1, 19-20 (2013) (discussing U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1). For a
discussion of the link between prisoners and slaves, see WHITMAN, supra note 84, at 173-
77.
182. ALEXANDER, supra note 100, at 199. As Khalil Bibran Muhammad has shown in
his detailed historical account of late nineteenth century discussions of crime and race, "the
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Alexander's analysis encompasses a class critique that
borrows from Loic Wacquant's account of the relationship between
class and the carceral state.83 Hyperincarceration of black people,
Wacquant argues, is a result of the "obsolescence of the ghetto as
a device for caste control and the . . . need for a substitute
apparatus for keeping (unskilled) African Americans 'in their
place.""8 4 Our criminal justice system, in this view, is a
mechanism for controlling the inevitable social deviancy that flows
from the marginalization of poor people under neoliberal social
and economic policies.85
statistical rhetoric of the 'Negro criminal' became a proxy for a national discourse on black
inferiority." MUHAMMAD, supra note 58, at 8, 16-21, 45-46.
183. LoIc WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF
SOCIAL INSECURITY 41-44 (2009). Alexander cites to Wacquant in A New Jim Crow.
ALEXANDER, supra note 100, at 219. Ahmed A. White similarly argues "the whole enterprise
of criminal justice must be understood above all in its relationship to the economic
structures of society." Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of
Law's Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759, 791 (2005); see also David E.
Barlow, Melissa Hickman Barlow & W. Wesley Johnson, The Political Economy of Criminal
Justice Policy: A Time-Series Analysis of Economic Conditions, Crime, and Federal
Criminal Justice Legislation, 1948-1987, 13 JUST. Q. 223 (1996) (exploring the relationship
between economic conditions, crime rates, and the federal legislative response). See
generally STEVEN Box, RECESSION, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 30-33 (1987) (explaining the
connection between recession, class, and crime). Similarly, Frances Fox Piven and Richard
Cloward have argued that the social welfare system expands and contracts as needed to
exert social control over those engaged in menial work for low wages. Richard A. Cloward
& Frances Fox Piven, The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty, NATION (May 2,
1966), http://thenation.com/article/weight-poor-strategy-end-poverty/; see also Katherine
Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the
Transformation of State Policy, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 43, 44 (2001) (discussing the use of
the welfare system and the criminal justice system to govern "social marginality"); Avi
Brisman, Ritualized Degradation i  the Twenty-first Century: A Revisitation of Piven and
Cloward's Regulating the Poor, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 793, 801 (2012) (arguing that
undocumented immigrants are degraded as a group as a form of social control); Kaaryn
Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 715 (2009)
("The criminalization of poverty highlights economically and legally institutionalized
ideologies of neo-liberalism, racism, sexism, and the dehumanization of the poor.").
184. Loic Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3
PUNISHMENT & SocY 95, 97 (2001).
185. Marie Gottschalk defines neoliberalism as "an ideology and package of policies
that deify low taxes, macroeconomic stabilization (through low inflation and low public
debt), financial and trade deregulation, privatization of public assets and services, and the
retrenchment of the welfare state." GOTTSCHALK, supra note 45, at 11. See generally DAVID
HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005). For a discussion of the link between
neoliberalism and the carceral state, see generally NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS'
DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 44-46
(2008); Barlow, Barlow & Johnson, supra note 183, at 239 (discussing the correlations
between economic conditions, crime rates, and federal criminal justice legislation); White,
supra note 183, at 778, 794 (arguing that capitalism generates marginalized people and
"unemployment necessitate[s] more frequent and intensive use of incarceration in order to
maintain constant levels of social control"). For an analysis of the connection between
neoliberal economic policies and the criminalization of immigrants, see Miller, supra note
155 (arguing that neo-liberal economic policies both encourage undocumented migration
and also facilitate the criminalization of these unauthorized border crossers).
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The thesis that our overly punitive law enforcement system is
a strategy of social control over low-income black people and other
people of color has affinities with other accounts of how the
rehabilitative focus of our criminal system was undermined and
replaced with a punitive one.186 David Garland attributes the shift
not only to the conservative backlash against civil rights successes
but to the scathing critiques of the rehabilitative model (including
by progressives) as well as multiple social, economic, and political
factors.187 He argues that the increase in crime rates and
corresponding punitive shift correlated with both a severe
economic recession and rapid social changes, including alterations
in family structure, a large baby boomer cohort of young males,
increased mobility, and the influence of television.8 8 A reactionary
response to these conditions of late modernity, in Garland's
account, converted a view of offenders as "needy delinquent[s]" to
one involving "threatening" and "racialized" images of "career
criminals, crackheads, thugs, and predators."189 The new
paradigm rests on the view that a "'dependency culture' of the
'underclass"' causes crime, "fuel[ing] public debates about he
supposed links between race and crime."'9 0
Jonathan Simon, presaging some of Alexander's insights, has
described how "racist narratives of exclusion" have been replaced
with "new and seemingly ethical narratives of crime or
terrorism."19 Our nation has become one that "govern[s] through
crime."1 9 2 For Simon, preoccupation with crime control influences
186. See, e.g., MARY BOSWORTH, EXPLAINING U.S. IMPRISONMENT 124-26 (2010);
GARLAND, supra note 29, at 41; MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE
POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 33-34 (2006); SIMON, supra note 31, at 52;
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 52-58 (2006); Kevin R. Reitz,
Don't Blame Determinacy: U.S. Incarceration Growth Has Been Driven by Other Forces, 84
TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1793-94 (2006).
187. GARLAND, supra note 29, at 97 ("Televised images of urban race riots, violent civil
rights struggles, anti-war demonstrations, political assassinations, and worsening street
crime reshaped the attitudes of the middle-American public in the late 1960s. . . .").
Garland argues that the post-war, welfare-based criminal justice system was conceptually
undermined by a challenge from the left. Progressives allied with the prisoners' rights
movement to question the characterization of prisoners as victims of deprivation or
pathology, as opposed to rational actors. Id. at 55-56. The "individualized treatment model"
was viewed as "discriminatory," and prison was "a tool to repress blacks, the poor, the young
and various cultural minorities." Id. at 55 (citing HILL & WANG, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 12
(1971)). Because the state was viewed as suspect, critics preferred uniform, as opposed to
discretionary, sentencing. Id. at 60-61. Garland argues that this progressive critique
created an "ideological vacuum" that was then filled by the right. Id. at 62-63.
188. Id. at 90-92.
189. Id. at 102.
190. Id. at 136.
191. SIMON, supra note 31, at 274.
192. Id. at 4.
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not only our approach to law enforcement and the threat of
terrorism but all aspects of our life, including our neighborhoods
and schools.193 Alexander, Wacquant, Garland, Simon, and others
have thus sought to shift the focus of the criminal justice reform
discussion toward a historical and structural understanding of
criminality and hyperincarceration.
These racial and class accounts of the carceral state support
a new conceptual framing for immigration reform. In this vision,
harsh criminal and immigration law enforcement practices are
understood as related means of social control over marginalized
communities, including poor black citizens and immigrants.
Yolanda VAzquez has argued that U.S. immigration detention and
deportation policy is a "tactic needed to . . . maintain racial
inequality and 'colorblind white dominance."'19 4  This
understanding of the relationship between criminal and
immigration enforcement demands a more inclusive approach to
immigration reform-one that seeks broad remedies for
noncitizens with criminal convictions, both documented and
undocumented. Under this approach, social change movement
actors recognize that the deviant/respectable distinction
perpetuates a racialized system of control that affects not only
immigrants but Blacks and other marginalized groups. Reformers
proceed on the understanding that "a claim for respectability
is .. . a claim for dominance."1 95 They refrain from seeking a
"toehold of respectability" by invoking a dichotomy between
criminals and immigrants and they minimize distinctions between
types of convicted noncitizens.19 6
Criminal justice advocates and organizers have worked for
decades to improve public perception of incarcerated, and formerly
incarcerated, people. Attempts to inject humanity into the
discussion of people with criminal records have included
jettisoning dehumanizing rhetoric like "drug offender" and
"ex-con" and educating the public about the ways in which
privilege, law enforcement choices, and socioeconomic policies
193. Foucault also saw a connection between punishment in schools and prisons. See
FOUCAULT, supra note 28, at 227-28. For a discussion of how the criminal justice system is
used to control homeless people in a futile attempt "to solve a set of entrenched social
problems," see KATHERINE BECKETT & STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL
CONTROL IN URBAN AMERICA 21-22 (2010).
194. VAzquez, Constructing Crimmigration, supra note 36, at 606-07 (quoting IAN
HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAw: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 147-48 (2006)).
195. Balos & Fellows, supra note 73, at 1296 (addressing the challenge of coalition
building for social change in the context of the movement to end gender violence).
196. See Mary Louise Fellows & Sherene Razack, The Race to Innocence: Confronting
Hierarchical Relations Among Women, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 335, 336-37 (1998)
(addressing the difficulties faced by marginalized groups when trying to organize).
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have resulted in higher arrest rates in impoverished communities
of color.19 7 Simplistic counterposing of immigrants against people
with criminal records undermines these efforts.
Moreover, there will always be people viewed as legitimately
occupying both categories of criminals and immigrants. It seems
unlikely that the public could maintain the prevalent, overly punitive
attitude toward people convicted of a crime and, at the same time,
support halting the deportation of individuals who have serious
convictions but robust membership claims due to strong U.S. ties
(like Ronald described in the Introduction). As crimmigration scholar
Juliet Stumpf has argued, both our criminal and immigration
systems have become intertwined precisely because they both involve
membership claims.198 The ability of reformers to rollback punitive
deportation practices and secure legalization for the broadest group
of undocumented immigrants as possible depends on the movement
for immigrant justice aligning its messaging and politics with those
of the racial justice movement to end hyperincarceration.199
Following in the footsteps of the racial justice movement, the
immigration reform movement could "choose[] to identify itself with
its lawbreakers."200
B. Coalition
The salience of the racial justice critique of
hyperincarceration to the immigrant rights movement reflects
deep connections between racism and nativism. Kevin Johnson
has mapped the "deeply complicated, often volatile,
relationship . . . between racism directed toward citizens and that
aimed at noncitizens," demonstrating how historically the two
have been intertwined.201 In the nineteenth century, before federal
197. See Jag Davies, We Are People-Not Addicts, Criminals, Inmates, and Convicts,
DRUG POL'Y ALLIANCE (Oct. 20, 2014), http://drugpolicy.org/blog/we-are-people-not
-addicts-criminals-inmates-and-convicts ("Media coverage of drugs and drug policy has
grown much more sophisticated in the past few years. . .. [Although some] still often use
inaccurate, offensive, or just plain absurd language that would be considered unthinkable
when covering other issues.").
198. Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis, supra note 76, at 396-97.
199. See Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-Blindness: The Racially Disparate
Impacts of Arizona's S.B. 1070 and the Failure of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 2
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 313, 358 (2012) (criticizing the fact that race is usually "buried in the
discussion" on immigration reform); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration
Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race
Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525, 528-29 (discussing the lack of consideration of race in
modern immigration legal scholarship).
200. Austin, supra note 62, at 1774.
201. Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration, Civil Rights, and Coalitions for Social Justice, 1
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 181, 181 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, Immigration, Civil
Rights, and Coalitions for Social Justice].
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immigration laws, the racial composition of frontier territories and
states was shaped by racist, local exclusion laws and federal
incentives for white people to move West.202 Mae N. Ngai has
charted how the United States has historically constructed
non-European immigrants, particularly undocumented Mexican
immigrants, as racialized "others," even lynching them and
subjecting them to Jim Crow laws.2 0 3 Contemporary studies show
that racism and anti-immigrant sentiment are linked when it
comes to crime.204 Attitudes of Whites towards Blacks pattern very
closely their views of immigrants.205 Support for harsh crime
control responses correlates with the view that people of color,
including immigrants, are disproportionately responsible for
crime.206
In light of these and other connections, Kevin Johnson and
others have called for immigrant rights and racial justice
advocates to work together.207 Viewing immigrant and racial
202. See Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration
Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1387-88, 1401 (2009).
203. NGAI, supra note 35, at 7, 50-55, 95, 132; see also Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression
Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1273-75 (1992) (noting how
otherness is perpetuated in many ways, including by nuances and microaggressions).
204. See, e.g., Kelly Welch et al., The Typification of Hispanics as Criminals and Support for
Punitive Crime Control Policies, 40 Soc. SCI. RES. 822 (2011) (discussing how the association of
Blacks and Hispanics with crime correlates with belief in punitive criminal justice policies); THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR
PUNITIVE POICIES (2014), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rdRaceandPunishment
.pdf (same).
205. Commentators have analyzed the ways in which attitudes towards immigrants have a
racial dimension. See, e.g., JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATI'ERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM, 1860-1925, at 132 (2d ed. 1988) (providing a historical account of the relationship
between nativism and racism); Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the
Inter/National Imagination, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1395, 1400-01 (1997) (discussing examples to
demonstrate "how the 'problem' of legal and illegal immigration is colored in the national
imagination: fear over immigration is not articulated solely around foreignness per se; it includes a
strong racial dimension'); Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture'" Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of
Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1616-17 (1996) ("[R]efusing an explicit consideration of
'race' or 'culture' within our legal system will not result in'colorblind' and 'cultureblind' meritocratic
justice, but in a replication of dominant patterns of dispersal of power."). Research from the 1970s
and 1980s demonstrated that anxiety about the economy resulted in both racism and more
restrictive attitudes toward immigrants. George E. Higgins, Shaun L. Gabbidon & Favian Martin,
The Role of Race/Ethnicity and Race Relations on Public Opinion Related to the Immigration and
Crime Link, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 51, 52 (2010).
206. Welch et al., supra note 204, at 822 ("[P]erceptions of Hispanics as criminals do increase
support for punitive crime control measures...."). A study found that "Blacks and Hispanics, in
support of. .. minority group threat theory, were less likely than Whites to believe that
immigration made crime worse." Higgins, Gabbidon & Martin, supra note 205, at 55. This study
also found that "the perception of bad racelethnic relations [is] associated with the belief that
immigration makes crime worse." Id.
207. Johnson, Immigration, Civil Rights, and Coalitions for Social Justice, supra note
201, at 183; Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for African American and Latina/o Cooperation
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justice as distinct perpetuates the very lack of solidarity that
immigrant reformers must move beyond. At the same time,
coalition building does not come without challenges.208 As Johnson
and Bill Ong Hing have noted, "historically," immigration has
"divid[ed] African Americans, Latina/os, and Asian Americans."209
Competition for jobs and political power has strained relationships
between immigrants and U.S.-born Blacks.210 Critical race
scholars and racial justice social movement actors point to the
tension between the impetus to build a broad-based, unified
movement for people of color and the need to prevent the erasure
of the distinct identity and issues of "legacy" Blacks.211
Immigrants' claim that the United States is a nation of
immigrants leaves out the experience of people descended from
slaves.212 Moreover, the movement for immigrant justice is not free
in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 FLA. L. REV. 341, 357-58 (2003);
see also Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence
of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 828 (1995) (discussing how building multiracial
coalitions is most important in the fight against racism); Francisco Valdes, Foreword:
Under Construction-LatCrit Consciousness, Community, and Theory, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
1087, 1120 (1997) ("[Clareful, sophisticated coalition-building, which includes rejecting all
forms of junior partnership within a coalitional agenda, can provide substantive and
political benefits that atomized anti-subordination projects are more likely to forego.").
208. See Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006
and the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (2007)
("[There are] many formidable hurdles before the emergence of a new, multiracial civil
rights movement.").
209. Johnson & Hing, supra note 208, at 101-02, 105-07.
210. NICoLAS C. VACA, THE PRESUMED ALLIANCE: THE UNSPOKEN CONFLICT BETWEEN
LATINOS AND BLACKS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR AMERICA 49-52, 57-61 (2004) (citing
Kenneth J. Meier & Joseph Stewart, Jr., Cooperation and Conflict in Multiracial School
Districts, 53 J. POL. 1123 (1991)); Mark Sawyer, Racial Politics in Multiethnic America:
Black and Latina/o Identities and Coalitions, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS: LATINOS,
BLACKS, AFRO-LATINOS 265, 266-67 (Anani Dzidzienyo & Suzanne Oboler eds., 2005).
211. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1141,
1158-59, 1177, 1183, 1199, 1203, 1213, 1227, 1231 (2007); Haunani-Kay Trask,
Coalition-Building Between Natives and Non-Natives, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1209 (1991);
see also Richard Delgado, Linking Arms: Recent Books on Interracial Coalition as an Avenue
of Social Reform, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 855, 858 (2003) (reviewing LANI GUINIER & GERALD
TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING
DEMOCRACY (2002); and ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND
RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999), both of which discuss "the power
of [racial] coalitions to effect change"); Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword:
Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
1585, 1600-02 (1997) (discussing how the "paradigmatic image of the racial Other in
American life has been the black body"); William R. Tamayo, When the "Coloreds" Are
Neither Black nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration,
2 ASIAN L.J. 1, 1, 8, 11-14 (1995) (discussing "the mutual misunderstandings which have
arisen between Blacks and the newer 'coloreds,"' and arguing "that these prejudices have
prevented the formation of a multiracial civil rights coalition").
212. Anna Williams Shavers, The Invisible Others and Immigrant Rights: A
Commentary, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 99, 111 (2008).
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from racism.213 Immigrants have sought gains by laying express
claims to whiteness.214 In his detailed account of .how blackness
became tethered to criminality, Khalil Gibran Muhammad
demonstrates how Progressive era "statistical comparisons
between the Foreign-born and the Negro were foundational to the
emergence of distinctive modern discourses on race-and crime."2 1 5
Statistics and "environmental theories of crime and delinquency
[were used] to demonstrate the assimilability of the Irish, the
Italian, and the Jew by explicit contrast to the Negro," who was
viewed as pathologically "savage[]."216 If "criminal" is code for
"Black," as Muhammad and Alexander contend, we can
understand the contemporary immigrant/criminal distinction as
yet another immigrant claim to whiteness.217
213. MUHAMMAD, supra note 58, at 54 ("[A]s black migration to Chicago gradually
increased [in the early twentieth century], 'Chicagoans of European extraction, including
both recent migrants and old-stock native-born Americans, often felt a powerful bond of
racial solidarity,' including a shared fear of blacks as criminals." (quoting JEFFREY S.
ADLER, FIRST IN VIOLENCE, DEEPEST IN DIRT: HOMICIDE IN CHICAGO, 1875-1920, at 319
n.10 (2006))); Devon W. Carbado, Racial Naturalization, 57 AM. Q. 633 (2005) (discussing
how assimilation into U.S. society includes becoming racially classified); Tanya Kateri
Herndndez, Latino Inter-Ethnic Employment Discrimination and the "Diversity" Defense,
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.REV. 259, 268 (2007) (discussing the entrenchment of racism in Latin
America and the Caribbean due to the legacy of slavery); Tanya Kateri Hernindez, 'Too
Black to Be Latino/a:' Blackness and Blacks as Foreigners in Latino Studies, 1 LATINO
STUD. 152 (2003) (discussing racism of Latinalos toward Blacks); Toni Morrison, On the
Backs of Blacks, in ARGUING IMMIGRATION: THE DEBATE OVER THE CHANGING FACE OF
AMERICA 97 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994) (discussing how assimilation into U.S. society
includes becoming racist).
214. Immigrants from India, Japan, Syria, and Mexico, among other countries, argued
that they were white to obtain more favorable treatment under immigration and
naturalization law. See NGAI, supra note 35, at 38-46, 50-54 (discussing lawsuits involving
claims to whiteness); Ariela J. Gross, Texas Mexicans and the Politics of Whiteness, 21 LAW
& HIST. REV. 195, 197-98 (2003) (some Mexicans claimed to be white to evade Jim Crow
segregation); George A. Martinez, The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican-Americans and
Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 321, 322-23 (1997) (discussing phenomenon of seeking
to pass as white); Shavers, supra note 212, at 116-17 (discussing immigrants' claims to
whiteness or status as not black). See generally NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME
WHITE (2008); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS: HOW AMERICA'S
IMMIGRANTS BECAME WHITE: THE STRANGE JOURNEY FROM ELLIS ISLAND TO THE SUBURBS
(2005).
215. MUHAMMAD, supra note 58, at 6 (emphasis omitted). For a social theory account
how blackness has become imbued with negative and durable social meaning, see GLENN
C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 67-73 (2002). For a general theory of racial
formation, see MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S, at 57-69 (1986).
216. MUHAMMAD, supra note 58, at 7, 34. As a result, "European immigrants-the
Irish and the Italians and the Polish, for example-gradually shed their criminal identities
while blacks did not[]" Id. at 5.
217. Discussing the development of how criminality became associated with blackness,
Khalil Gibran Muhammad has observed that at "its worst, the stigma of criminality was an
intellectual defense of lynching, colonial-style criminal justice practices, and genocide." Id.
at 11. The immigrant advocacy and organizing group Families for Freedom states on its
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Assuming that these challenges to coalition building can be
navigated, now is an opportune time for immigrant justice
reformers to work in concert with those interested in ending
hyperincarceration in the criminal justice system. Due in part to
Alexander having popularized the racial account of the carceral
state, policymakers have begun taking a hard look at our bloated
criminal justice system, a move facilitated by fiscal concerns, the
shortcomings of the war on drugs, and falling crime rates. The last
ten years have seen a shift in public opinion about mass criminal
incarceration. In 2001, the Pew Research Center reported that
roughly half of the public supported the move away from
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses; that percentage
is now up to 63%.218 Today, 67% of the public favors a focus on
treatment rather than prosecution for use of drugs such as heroin
and cocaine.219 In the four-year span of 2009 to 2013, forty states
rolled back the punitiveness of their drug laws.2 20
The U.S. Department of Justice has embarked on what
promises to be at least a small course correction in the federal
criminal system with the "Smart on Crime" initiative.221 The
initiative reduces sentences for minor, nonviolent drug offenses
and refocuses resources on diversion and reentry programs. It
further seeks to limit the collateral consequences of convictions as
formerly incarcerated people reenter our communities.222 Moving
away from a focus on individual character traits and community
culture, the initiative promises to keep people safer by focusing on
the social and economic factors that correlate with crime.223
Endorsing a structural critique of hyperincarceration, U.S.
Attorney General Eric Holder pointed to the "vicious cycle of
website that the phrase "We're not criminals!" is "probably the most embarrassing,
anti-criminal justice, anti-black mantra of the mainstream movement." M6nica Novoa,
Letter to the Movement: Inciting Love & Casting out Shame in 2015, FAMILIES FOR FREEDOM
(Jan. 15, 2015), http://familiesforfreedom.org/news/letter-movement-inciting-love-casting-
out-shame-2015-m6nica-novoa.
218. PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA'S NEW DRUG POLICY LANDSCAPE: TWO-THIRDS
FAVOR TREATMENT, NOT JAIL, FOR USE OF HEROIN, COCAINE 1, 7 (2014), http://people
-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/04-02-14 Drug Policy Release.pdf.
219. Id. at 8.
220. Medical marijuana is legal in twenty-three states and is entirely legal in Alaska,
Colorado, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia. See 23 Legal Medical
Marijuana States and DC, PROCON, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.res
ource.php?resourceID=000881 (last updated Jan. 7, 2016).
221. SMART ON CRIME, supra note 94.
222. Id. at 3, 5.
223. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks on Criminal Justice Reform at
Georgetown University Law Center (Feb. 11, 2014), http://justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches
/2014/ag-speech- 14021 1.html ("[M]aintaining family connections, developing job skills, and
fostering community engagement can reduce the likelihood of re-arrest.").
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poverty, criminality, and incarceration [that] traps too many
Americans and weakens too many communities."2 2 4 A central focus
of "Smart on Crime" is a program to commute long sentences and
ease reentry of formerly incarcerated people through restoration
of voting and other civic rights.225 Employing a racial justice lens,
the Attorney General observed that felony disenfranchisement
"echo[es] policies during a deeply troubled period in America's
past-a time of post-Civil War repression" when "many Southern
states enacted disenfranchisement schemes to specifically target
African Americans and diminish the electoral strength of
newly-freed populations."226
Several federal legislative changes aimed at reducing
hyperincarceration have been implemented or are in the works.2 27
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the gross disparity in
sentences between powder and crack cocaine.228 The Second
Chance Act provides millions in funding every year for reentry
programs at the state and local level.229 The Smarter Sentencing
Act puts discretion back into the hands of judges.230 The Senate
Judiciary Committee has expressed bipartisan support for
reducing mandatory minimums for federal drug offenses and
shortening the sentences for inmates who attend rehabilitation
programs.231 The U.S. Sentencing Commission has voted to reduce
federal sentences for drug traffickers.232
224. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association's House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://justice.gov
/opalspeechlattorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meeting-american-bar
-associations.
225. Holder, supra note 223.
226. Id.
227. For a discussion of initiatives and proposed legislation to curb hyperincarceration,
see Hector L. Ramos-Vega, Proposed Legislation and Other Initiatives to Reduce Prison
Terms for Nonviolent Drug Offenders: A Great Step Toward Curbing Mass Incarceration,
but Is It Enough?, FED. LAW., Aug. 2014, at 4, 4-6.
228. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.); Carol S. Steiker, Lessons from Two
Failures: Sentencing for Cocaine and Child Pornography Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in the United States, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 30 (2013).
229. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.); Reentry and Community Corrections
Committee: Second Chance Act, AS'N ST. CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATORS,
http://asca.net/projects/13/pages/139 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
230. See Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, S. 1410, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014); see also
Justice Safety Valve Act of 2015, S. 353, 114th Cong. § 2.
231. Senate Judiciary Committee Approves Smarter Sentencing Bill, ABA WASH.
LET-TER, Feb. 2014, at 3, 3, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications
/GAO/2014/2014feb-wl.authcheckdam.pdf.
232. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes to
Reduce Drug Trafficking Sentences, (Apr. 10, 2014), http://ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf
/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/20140410_PressRelease.pdf. It
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The support for prison reform is bipartisan.233 Kentucky is one
of a number, of conservative states to have passed bipartisan
legislation to reduce incarceration, largely for cost saving
reasons.234 Kentucky Republican Senator Rand Paul is
co-sponsoring with a Democrat the REDEEM Act, which would
incentivize states to make eighteen the age of criminal
responsibility, among other reforms.235 Kansas now requires that
many drug offenders convicted of simple possession enter drug
treatment.236 In addition to reducing incarceration rates for drug
possession, probation revocations went from 25% to 12% and
parole violations reduced by 44%.237
The strange bedfellows for criminal justice reform include Tea
Party billionaires Charles and David Koch, who have joined liberal
politicians and organizations like the ACLU "to reduce
incarceration by 50 percent in eight years."2 38 Prominent
is estimated that 70% of defendants convicted of drug trafficking offenses stand to benefit
from the amendment. Id.
233. For example, Republican Senator Rand Paul from Kentucky supports sentencing
and prison reform measures put forth by Attorney General Eric Holder. Paul Steinhauser,
Ashley Killough & Greg Clary, Rand Raul: 'Fight for Justice Now' on Unfair Sentencing,
CNN (July 25, 2014, 12:41 PM), http://cnn.com/2014/07/25/politics/paul
-urban-league/.
234. Kentucky projects a cost savings of over $400 million. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS
WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 17-51 (2011), https://aclu.org/files/assets/smartreform
ispossible.pdf (profiling Texas, Kansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Kentucky, and Ohio).
The cost of treatment averages $3,422 per person, whereas the cost of imprisonment is
$24,970. Jennifer Roth, Kansas Featured in Smart Reform Report, BENDS TOWARD JUST.
(Aug. 19, 2011), http://rothjenniferl.typepad.com/bendstowardjustice/2011/08/kansas-reco
gnized-for-smart-on-crime-measures.html. California, New Jersey, and New York have
reduced their inmate populations by 20% in the last ten years. Marc Mauer, Why Prison
Populations Are Shrinking and How to Shrink Them More, GOVERNING (Mar. 20, 2014),
http://governing.com/gov-institute/voices/col-states-how-shrink-prison-population-costs-in
carceration.html. Other states like Georgia, Michigan, South Carolina, and Texas are on a
similar path. Id.
235. Press Release, Rand Paul, Sens. Paul and Booker Re-Introduce the REDEEM Act
(Mar. 9, 2015), http://paul.senate.gov/news/press/sens-paul-and-booker-re-introduce
-the-redeem-act.
236. For criticism of some reentry programs, see generally Gerald P. L6pez, How
Mainstream Reformers Design Ambitious Reentry Programs Doomed to Fail and Destined
to Reinforce Targeted Mass Incarceration and Social Control, 11 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 1 (2014).
237. Roth, supra note 234. As further proof of the effectiveness of treatment programs,
Kansas subsequently rolled back some of its programs and saw an increase in parole
violations. Id.
238. Erik Eckholm, A. C.L. U. in $50 Million Push to Reduce Jail Sentences, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2014, at A14. The Koch brothers have identified five goals for reform, including "fair
treatment under the law; competent and fair representation; mandatory minimum reforms;
and restoration of rights." Dana Liebelson, Inside the Koch Campaign to Reform Criminal
Justice, HUFFINGTON . POST (Feb. 9, 2015, 2:42 PM), http://huffington
post.com/2015/02/09/koch-brothers_n_6646540.html.
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conservative Newt Gingrich supported the passage of California's
Proposition 47.239 This ballot initiative redesignates some
nonviolent felony offenses as misdemeanors and provides that the
resulting financial savings be used for programs aimed at keeping
people out of the criminal justice system.240
The extent of the turning tide is limited, however. Current
prison reforms are modest and usually aimed at the most
politically palatable group of formerly incarcerated people, namely
men and women convicted of low-level, nonviolent drug offenses. 241
Much criminal justice reform rhetoric perpetuates the
deserving/undeserving narrative, drawing a bright line between
minor drug offenders and others, usually described as serious drug
dealers or violent offenders.242 The next frontier of criminal justice
reform-one that more significantly rejects respectability
messaging-would involve expanding the category of crimes to
which a less punitive approach should apply.2 4 3 Widening the
ambit of concern would have the most impact in state prison
systems, where, in 2012, 54% of incarcerated people were serving
time for a violent offense, compared to 16% for a drug crime.244
Moreover, cost savings, rather than concerns about racial
impact, human dignity, or the harms of hyperincarceration, are
what drive bipartisan alliances in the criminal justice arena. As
Marie Gottschalk and others have cautioned, the "cost-benefit
language is problematic," as it "constricts the political space to
239. Gary Cohn, Newt Gingrich and Jay-Z Find Common Cause in a Prison Reform
Proposition, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2014, 6:15 PM), http://huffingtonpost.com
/2014/10/23/proposition-47_n_6038310.html; Newt Gingrich & B. Wayne Hughes Jr.,
Opinion, What California Can Learn from the Red States on Crime and Punishment, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014, 5:27 PM), http://latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0917-gingricl
-prop--47-criminal-justice-20140917-story.html (commenting on the benefits of Proposition
47 and urging voters to support it).
240. Proposition 47, LEGIS. ANALYST'S OFF. (Nov. 4, 2014), http://1ao.ca.gov/ballot
/2014/prop-47-110414.aspx.
241. See MARC MAUER & NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FEWER
PRISONERS, LESS CRIME: A TALE OF THREE STATES (2014), http://sentencingproject.org
/doc/publications/incFewerPrisonersLessCrime.pdf.
242. See Andrea Roth, Opinion, Let's Consider Leniency for Many 'Violent' Offenders
Too, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-roth-non
-violent-prison-clemency-20150724-story.html.
243. See Marc Mauer & David Cole, Opinion, How to Lock up Fewer People, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2015, at SR6 (urging those concerned about mass incarceration to look
beyond convicted of "low-level drug crimes and other non-violent offenses" to people
convicted at violent crimes).
244. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 247282, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 2, 15
(2014), http:/Ibjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pl3.pdf. As Marie Gottschalk points out, the focus on
violent crime is important because of "disproportional representation of blacks 'among the
more serious versions within each of the offense types."' GOTTSCHALK, supra note 45, at
125-26 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Alfred Blumstein, On the Racial Disproportionality of
United States'Prison Populations, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1259, 1268 (1982)).
2016] 743
744 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [53:3
challenge penal policies and practices on social justice or human
rights grounds" and fails to challenge the political and economic
interests responsible for the carceral state.245 Moreover, much of
the money saved has been funneled into law enforcement
programs rather than poor communities.246 "[L]eft-right"
coalitions on criminal justice reform are thus "fraught with [both]
possibility and peril."2 47
Despite their limitations, reforms in the criminal justice
system contrast starkly with our nation's persistently punitive
immigration practices. Deportation laws continue to make
virtually all drug-related offenses a trigger for removal. The
distribution of even a small amount of drugs results in the
"aggravated felony" label.248 Now more than ever, immigration
reformers have both philosophical and strategic reasons to ensure
that their politics and analyses line up with those of the
progressive movement to end hyperincarceration.
C. The Causes of Crime
The respectable-immigrants-only vision of immigration
reform rests on the dominant view of criminal behavior as simply
a product of bad choices by discrete individuals.249 An alternate
framework for immigration reform understands our criminal
justice regime as a race- and class-based system of control in which
crime rates are a function of policy choices.250 Of course, crime
245. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 45, at 17; see also Sonja B. Starr, On the Role of Cost-
Benefit Analysis in Criminal Justice Policy: A Response to The Imprisoner's Dilemma, 98
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 97 (2013).
246. GOTSCHALK, supra note 45, at 99. Gottschalk describes how Texas has been
"hailed ... as a model" on prison reform but at the same time has been "energetically
disinvesting" from disadvantaged communities. Id. at 108, 111.
247. Id. at 16. Gottschalk provocatively asks: "[I]s it truly possible to make serious
reductions in the size and gross inequities of the carceral state through a largely top-down
process that is ostensibly non-partisan and politically bloodless?" Id. at 100.
248. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012). See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the "aggravated felony" definition. The only exception is social sharing of a
small amount of marijuana. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693-94 (2013).
249. Marie Gottschalk has observed that individual "explanations that stress personal
responsibility have continued to trump structural ones in discussions of crime, punishment,
and penal reform, thus reinforcing the neoliberal slant in penal policy." GOTPSCHALK, supra
note 45, at 15; see also Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal
Stand Your Ground, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 961, 1017-18 (2014) (discussing how tough-on-crime
ideology views criminal behavior as "internal to the individual"); D. Marvin Jones, "He's a
Black Male .. . Something Is Wrong with Him!" The Role of Race in the Stand Your Ground
Debate, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1025, 1037 (2014) ("While the reasons for blacks' relatively
marginalized economic status are deeply associated with structural factors, the overwhelming
mainstream view is that people become a part of this group basically through bad choices.").
250. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text (discussing the role of neoliberal
economic and social policies).
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rates relate not only to enforcement decisions about whom, and
what types of activity, to target, but also to the levels of unlawful
activity. Criminologists do not agree on precisely what causes
people to engage in criminal activity. Individual characteristics,
such as gender, genetics, mental illness, and conditions in the
brain, may make people more prone to commit crime.251 Although
some people break the law even while living under ideal social and
economic conditions, a growing consensus points to how structural
features of our society influence behavior leading to criminal
activity.252
Historical and neighborhood-level factors have strong
explanatory power, at least with respect to street and violent
crime.253 The legacy of slavery and segregation as well as
251. For a summary of the evidence that genetic markers are associated with certain
types of crime, see Terrie E. Moffitt, Stephen Ross & Adrian Raine, Crime and Biology, in
CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 80, at 53, 53. For a discussion of how brain
functioning influences behavior, see infra note 283 and accompanying text. See also David
Eagleman, The Brain on Trial, ATLANTIC, July-Aug. 2011, at 112. Young men may be more
vulnerable to structural effects than young women. Moffitt, Ross & Raine, supra note 80,
at 53, 53-54 ("[In almost all mammalian species, .. . males begin to seek novelty, search
for stimulation, roam afar from family, and engage in risk-taking around the age of
reproductive maturity. This phenomenon [is] called 'dispersal' . . . . Evolutionary
psychologists think that dispersal has intriguing implications for our understanding of the
adolescent peak of the age-crime curve." (citations omitted)). In 2003, Human Rights Watch
reported that one in six people in jail or prison are mentally ill, and that there are three
times more mentally ill people in prisons than in hospitals. SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE
FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 1, 18 (Joseph Saunders & James Ross eds., 2003),
https://hrw.org/reports/2003/usalO03/usalOO3.pdf. Some individuals become mentally ill
after being incarcerated due to the conditions of their confinement. See id. at 149-50.
252. White, supra note 183, at 794-95 ("[S]ocial structure plays a key role in
conditioning more conscious behaviors within the criminal justice system.").
253. Street crime typically refers to "murder, assault, robbery, rape, burglary, and
larceny." John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson, Criminal Inequality in America: Patterns and
Consequences, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 14, 15 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995)
[hereinafter Hagan & Peterson, Criminal Inequality in America]. The contention that crime
rates are based on structural factors rather than individual population attributes finds
support in research showing that socially and economically disadvantaged neighborhoods in
twenty-one U.S. cities had high crime rates over the course of many years notwithstanding
racial and ethnic changes in population. See id. at 14 (citing CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D.
McKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS 14, 315-19 (1942)); see also id. at 3, 7
("[G]roups that are economically deprived-particularly young, disadvantaged minority
males-are . . . heavily involved in serious criminal offenses, especially violent street
crime.... [M]acrosocial patterns of residential inequality give rise to the social isolation and
ecological concentration of the truly disadvantaged in ghetto communities[, which] leads to
structural barriers and cultural adaptations that undermine social organization and hence
the control of crime."); Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race,
Crime, and Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY, supra, at 37, 39 (certain
characteristics of communities lead to a high crime rate). The causes of white-collar crime
might be different. See EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION
5-7 (1983) (criticizing theories of crime which blame illegal behavior on poverty, broken
homes, and Freudian fixations and noting that healthy upbringings and intact psyches have
not served to deter lawbreaking by persons in positions of power).
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neoliberal economic and political choices have resulted in
urban areas of concentrated poverty and disadvantage, the
sites of the highest rates of reported crime.254 Much
contemporary thinking about the structural causes of crime
points to how economic and social forces break down social
structure and "community-based social controls" that keep
crime rates low. 25 5 Income inequality, unemployment, and the
lack of education and community resources are linked to high
crime rates, and, conversely, the infusion of resources and
institution building correlates with a reduction in crime.256
"Building social capital," not additional law enforcement and
incarceration, may be the best crime prevention.257 Stabilizing
and spreading out new public housing among different
communities can also reduce crime.258 Increasing education
254. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 57-58 (1987) (discussing the cause of concentrated
poverty and its effects on communities, including increasing reported crime rates); Martha
A. Gephart, Neighborhoods and Communities as Contexts for Development, in 1
NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES FOR CHILDREN 1, 1 (Jeanne
Brooks-Gunn et al. eds., 1997) ("During the past several decades, poverty in the United
States has become more urban, spatially concentrated, and clustered with other indicators
of disadvantage.").
255. The "social disorganization" theory of Shaw and McKay, first developed in the
1940s, has gained popularity again. See Hagan & Peterson, Criminal Inequality in America,
supra note 253, at 14; Scot Wortley et al., The Root Causes of Youth Violence: A Review of
Major Theoretical Perspectives, in THE REVIEW OF THE ROOTS OF YOUTH VIOLENCE 1, 54-
55 (Roy McMurtry & Alvin Curling eds., 2008). For discussion of the social disorganization
theory of Shaw and McKay, see supra note 253.
256. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 45, at 82 ("The chronically marginalized and the
chronically disadvantaged are the people most likely to end up in jail or prison."); Raymond
H. Brescia, The Cost of Inequality: Social Distance, Predatory Conduct, and the Financial
Crisis, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 641, 659 (2011) (citing RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE
PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 190-96
(2009)) (stating that nations with higher income inequality have the greatest prevalence of
social ills); Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman & Norman Loayza, Inequality and Violent
Crime, 45 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2002) ("Crime rates and inequality are positively correlated
within countries and, particularly, between countries, and this correlation reflects
causation from inequality to crime rates . .. ."); Matthew Freedman & Emily G. Owens,
Low-Income Housing Development and Crime, 70 J. URB. ECON. 115, 115 (2011)
("[L]ow-income housing development in the poorest neighborhoods brings with it significant
reductions in violent crime."); John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson, Introduction to CRIME AND
INEQUALITY, supra note 253, at 1, 4 ("[G]1aring social and economic inequalities in our
society impose correspondingly high costs in the form of street crime.").
257. Ichiro Kawachi, Bruce P. Kennedy & Richard G. Wilkinson, Crime: Social
Disorganization and Relative Deprivation, 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 719, 729 (1999). "Social
capital is the capacity of a person to accomplish important personal aims through that
person's connections to others." Clear, supra note 133, at 185 (emphasis omitted).
258. Robert J. Sampson, The Community, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 80,
at 210, 226-28; see also Adam Bickford & Douglas S. Massey, Segregation in the Second
Ghetto: Racial and Ethnic Segregation in American Public Housing, 1977, 69 Soc. FORCES
1011, 1035 (1991) (explaining how the U.S. public housing system currently operates as a
publically funded system to isolate people by race and class).
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and employment opportunities has been shown to have a
similar effect.259
Peer and family influences also may play a role, as well as
violence in the home.260 Approximately 63% of imprisoned young
men, aged eleven to twenty, who were convicted of homicide had
killed the batterer of their mothers.261 More controversially, some
have pointed to the negative influence of a "ghetto culture" that
gained influence after the middle class moved out of urban centers
in the 1970s.262 As explained by William Julius Wilson, "instead of
focusing on the changing situational and structural factors that
accompanied the black middle- and working-class exodus from the
inner city," some have pointed to "a ghetto culture of poverty."263
Rejecting this focus on culture, Wilson suggests that the structural
"concentration effects" of poverty more accurately explain inner
city crime rates.264 In particular, unemployment due to "social
isolation ... from the job network system" better explains the
phenomenon of how "welfare and the underground economy"
became regarded "as a way of life." 265 As Regina Austin has
commented, some view "straight life [as] 'filled with drudgery and
259. Lance Lochner, Non-Production Benefits of Education: Crime, Health, and Good
Citizenship 27-30 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16722, 2011)
(finding that improvements in education can lower crime and other social benefits); see also
Price V. Fishback, Ryan S. Johnson & Shawn Kantor, Striking at the Roots of Crime: The
Impact of Welfare Spending on Crime During the Great Depression, 53 J.L. & ECON. 715,
733 (2010) (discussing how New Deal spending reduced the crime rate).
260. A study found that "exposure to violence had a negative effect on
parenting, ... reduc[ing] parents' ability to properly monitor their children." See Wesley G.
Jennings et al., A Multi-Level Approach to Investigating Neighborhood Effects on Physical
Aggression Among Urban Chicago Youth, 36 AM. J. CRIV\. JUST. 392, 395 (2011) (citing
Richard Spano, Alexander T. Vazsonyi & John Bolland, Does Parenting Mediate the Effects
of Exposure to Violence on Violent Behavior? An Ecological-Transactional Model of
Community Violence, 32 J. ADOLESCENCE 1321 (2009)).
261. Crenshaw, supra note 71, at 1255.
262. WILSON, supra note 254, at 55-56.
263. Id. at 55. Wilson identifies the "popular media" as primarily responsible for
attributing crime to culture. Id. Theorists, however, have also endorsed this view. See John
Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson, Introduction to CRIME AND INEQUALITY, supra note 253, at 1, 4
(citing to theorists who contend that "the greater involvement of have-nots in crimes of
violence has a cultural foundation").
264. WILSON, supra note 254, at 58 (emphasis omitted). Khalil Gibran Muhammad,
discussing late nineteenth and early twentieth century discourse on crime, documents how
a focus on black culture replaced a prior focus on biology. MUHAMMAD, supra note 58, at 99.
265. WILSON, supra note 254, at 57; see also John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson,
Introduction to CRIME AND INEQUALITY, supra note 253, at 1, 7 (culture is an "adaptation[]"
to structural forces); Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory ofRace,
Crime and Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY, supra note 253, at 37, 41 ("[If
cultural influences exist, they vary systematically with structural features of the urban
environment.... The sources of violent crime appear to be remarkably invariant across
race and rooted instead in the structural differences among communities, cities, and states
in economic and family organization.").
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disappointment"' because the available jobs are "restricted and
tedious."266
Crime, especially violent crime, reflects the health of a society
and is thus best regarded as "a social mirror." 2 6 7 A focus on
immigrants and crime diverts much needed attention away from
our attempts to understand the ways in which our society's
economic and social policies breed criminality. Crime is typically
not imported but homegrown.268 Although the United States has
experienced episodes of groups of people seeking entry having
already been convicted of a crime, the Mariel boatlift being the
most prominent example, the vast majority of convicted
noncitizens accrued their criminal record subsequent o entry.269
Statistics show that "the longer immigrants . . . residef[ in the
United States, the higher [are] their incarceration rates."2 70
Addressing differences in how ethnic communities fare in the
United States, Alejandro Portes has illustrated how "labor" and
266. Austin, supra note 62, at 1796 (first quoting Priscilla Alexander, Prostitution: A
Difficult Issue for Feminists, in SEX WORK: WRITINGS BY WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY 188
(Fr6d6rique Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander eds., 1987); and then quoting ELEANOR M.
MILLER, STREET WOMAN 148 (1986)).
267. Kawachi, Kennedy & Wilkinson, supra note 257, at 719 (demonstrating that
"crime-especially violent crime-is a sensitive indicator of social relations in society"); see
MUHAMMAD, supra note 58, at 69 ("[Crime is] a symptom of countless wrong social
conditions." (quoting W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO: A SOCIAL STUDY 242
(Univ. of Pa. Press ed. 1996) (1899))).
268. See Ben Feldmeyer, Immigration and Violence: The Offsetting Effects of
Immigrant Concentration on Latino Violence, 38 Soc. Scl. RES. 717, 719 (2009) ("Latino
immigrants are not a particularly crime-prone group and generally do not have criminal
motives when they enter the country."); supra note 8 and accompanying text.
269. But see Dingeman & Rumbaut, supra note 39, at 382-83 (citing RUBEN G.
RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POL'Y CTR., THE MYTH OF IMMIGRANT
CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG NATIVE
AND FOREIGN-BORN MEN 13 (2007)) (stating that contrary to popular opinion, Marielitos
"were not overrepresented among either homicide victims or offenders"). An important
exception to the general rule that crime is not imported is the phenomenon of transnational
gang activity. Commentators have pointed out, however, that the origin of transnational
gangs can be traced to the United States' deportation of gang members to Central America
and Mexico. See DOUGLAS FARAH, WOODROW WILSON INT'L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, ORGANIZED
CRIME IN EL SALVADOR: THE HOMEGROWN AND TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 12 (2011),
http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Farah.FIN1.pdf; see also Jonah M. Temple, Note,
The Merry-Go-Round of Youth Gangs: The Failure of the U.S. Immigration Removal Policy
and the False Outsourcing of Crime, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 193, 193 (2011) ("The United
States' policy of deporting noncitizen criminals to their countries of origin is fueling a
proliferation of gang membership both in Central America and in the United States.
Deportation does not deter gang activity but instead helps to facilitate the transnational
movement of youth gangs."). For a discussion of how gang violence in El Salvador is now
attributable to local youth rather than deportees, see Dingeman & Rumbaut, supra note
39, at 396. For a discussion of how U.S. rhetoric about Mexican gang violence and the
transnational threat is exaggerated, see Weissman, supra note 2, at 164-67.
270. Dingeman & Rumbaut, supra note 39, at 377 (emphasis omitted) (citing to 2000
Census data).
2016] "IMMIGRANTS ARE NOT CRIMINALS" 749
"professional" immigrants possess different human capital and are
received differently by host communities.271 It is these "structural
features" that determine whether immigrant groups will become
part of "high-status model groups poised to be integrated promptly
into the American mainstream or into caste-like, impoverished
minorities."272
An accurate analysis of the causes of crime would focus on the
larger economic and social forces in play, resisting the temptation
to understand crime control as a simple matter of deporting or
locking up certain groups of people.273 Deporting convicted
noncitizens, like an overly punitive approach to criminal law
enforcement, fails to engage with the structural causes of crime.274
A more inclusive vision of immigration reform takes a big picture
view of crime, casting it as largely a function of economic and social
forces for which we as a nation bear collective responsibility. 275
D. The Free Will Trap
The moral culpability of committing a crime impedes efforts
to advocate for better treatment of convicted noncitizens, both
documented and undocumented.27 6 Those who support
immigration reform are more willing to forgive the transgressions
of people who cross the border without permission than those who
commit crimes after entry. What I will call the "free will trap"
271. Portes, supra note 149, at 94. For a critique of how the segmented assimilation
theory relies upon the model-minority narrative, cultural explanations for crime, and a
corresponding "antiblack ideology," see Tamara K. Nopper, Asian Americans, Deviance,
Crime, and the Model Minority Myth, in 1 COLOR BEHIND BARS: RACISM IN THE U.S. PRISON
SYSTEM 207, 208, 235-36 (Scott Win. Bowman ed., 2014).
272. Portes, supra note 149, at 94. Commentators have pointed to the myth of
immigrant upward mobility in U.S. society. See Richard Delgado, The Myth of Upward
Mobility, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 879, 882, 901-02 (2007). These insights are a response to Adam
Cox and Eric Posner's argument that we should judge immigrants by their post-entry
conduct. See Cox & Posner, supra note 30, at 836-40.
273. As Jennifer Chac6n has discussed, "[T]here is little reason to believe that [the
recent] expansion in the removal of non-citizens will serve as an effective or efficient means
of decreasing domestic crime or preventing undocumented migration." Chac6n, Unsecured
Borders, supra note 33, at 1832.
274. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, It's the Economy, Stupid: The Hijacking of the
Debate over Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War on Drugs,
War on Terror, Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583 (2010).
275. For a related analysis of how gender violence must be understood in the context
of the political economy and how the movement to end gender violence should work in
coalition with the anti-poverty movement, see Weissman, The Personal Is Political, supra
note 72, at 428-30. See also infra note 280.
276. Marie Gottschalk has observed, "Issues of crime and punishment are so vexing
because they are inextricably bound up with judgments about morality, how social benefits
and burdens should be allocated, the proper reach of the government, and what kind of
democratic society the United States is, was, and will be." Gottschalk, supra note 135, at
564 (citing IAN LOADER & RICHARD SPARKS, PUBLIC CRIMINOLOGY? 108 (2011)).
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thwarts dismantling the view that deportation is appropriately
used for crime control. The free will trap is the idea that, while
structural forces might place a person at risk of engaging in
criminal activity, people exercise their free will when they choose
whether to commit a crime.2" Supporting the free will trap is the
observation that the majority of people considered "at risk" for
committing a crime do not do SO. 2 78 Because violent offenders
create victims, the free will trap is particularly acute as it relates
to them.
The free will objection flows from the prevailing
criminological paradigm that criminal activity stems from bad
choices by individuals.279 If crime is simply the exercise of free will,
an unforgiving immigration system based on crime control
appears justified. The recognition that criminal conduct is driven
at least in part by economic and social forces, the legacy of slavery
and racial segregation, and discriminatory enforcement practices,
however, complicates this view and suggests that society at large
is at least partially responsible.280
Rather than regard criminals as unredeemable others, a
structural view suggests that not very much apart from
circumstances of birth separates those who have never been
convicted from those who have.281 One provocative attempt to turn
277. For an analogous discussion of how homelessness is viewed as "an individual
choice," see BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 193, at 25.
278. Terrie E. Moffitt, Stephen Ross & Adrian Raine, Crime and Biology, in CRIME
AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 80, at 53, 56 ("Most people who are socially disadvantaged
do not become involved in an antisocial, criminal lifestyle, and many wealthy people do
commit crimes."). Prosecutors make this argument in opposition to mitigation in death
penalty cases. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that capital sentencing can be
based on "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
279. GARLAND, supra note 29, at 185; Susan D. Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 307, 309-11 (2005). As discussed supra note 30, this view of criminal activity
undergirds the argument of Adam Cox and Eric Posner in favor of post entry population
selection criteria.
280. Ahmed White argues that "structure and [individual] agency represent
complementary dynamics" and that "social structure plays a key role in conditioning more
conscious behaviors within the criminal justice system." White, supra note 183, at 794.
Glenn C. Loury argues that society should "recognize a kind of social responsibility, even
for the wrongful acts freely chosen by individual persons." GLENN C LOURY ET AL., RACE,
INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES 32-33 (2008) ("[Although] individuals always have
choices . . . [s]ociety at large is implicated in an individual person's choices because we have
acquiesced in-perhaps actively supported, through our taxes and votes, words and deeds-
social arrangements that work to our benefit and his detriment, and which shape his
consciousness and sense of identity in such a way that the choices he makes, which we may
condemn, are nevertheless compelling to him-an entirely understandable response to
circumstance.").
281. See ALEXANDER, supra note 100, at 215 ("All people make mistakes. All of us are
sinners.").
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the criminal/noncriminal binary on its head appears in the work
of the group "We Are All Criminals," a project that "seeks to
challenge society's perception of what it means to be a criminal"
by telling the stories of people who committed crimes but were
never arrested.282 The project maintains a website of video
confessions by people who committed crimes but who never had to
live with the stigma of being arrested, usually because their race
or class protected them from arrest.
In addition to a focus on the structural causes of crime and
crime rates, advances in science may also help dispel the view that
crime is simply the product of people opting to act in a wicked or
antisocial manner. Neuroscience supplies scientific explanations
of how decision-making is shaped in many ways by social forces
and conditions in the brain.283 While these findings may be
compatible with a belief in free will, they may moderate our
collective views on what degree of punishment is warranted in any
given case.2 84 Some contend that when people are informed about
the science of decision-making they become less punitive.285 With
282. See WE ARE ALL CRIMINALS, http://weareallcriminals.org/about/ (last visited Feb.
6, 2016).
283. For an introduction to the emerging field of law and neuroscience, see Owen D.
Jones & Matthew Ginther, Law and Neuroscience, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 489 (2d ed. 2015); Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Law
and Neuroscience: Present and Future, 65 NILQ 243 (2014); see also Gideon Yaffe,
Neurological Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, in 118 HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL
NEUROLOGY: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN NEUROLOGY 345, 346 (James L. Bernat &
Richard Beresford eds., 2013) (discussing ways in which neurological disorders are relevant
to determining criminal culpability); Adrian Raine, Biosocial Studies of Antisocial and
Violent Behavior in Children and Adults: A Review, 30 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 311
(2002) (summarizing research documenting social and biological risk factors for criminal
activity and documenting 39 examples of how social and biological risk factors interact).
284. An ongoing debate exists about whether neuroscience has established that there
is no free will and a scientific basis for determinism. Compare Joshua Greene & Jonathan
Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y B 1775, 1776 (2004) (arguing that science debunks free will),
with Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A
Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 402-03 (2006) (arguing that neuroscience and
free will can coexist).
285. See, e.g., Emad H. Atiq, How Folk Beliefs About Free Will Influence Sentencing: A
New Target for the Neuro-Determinist Critics of Criminal Law, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 449,
476-77 (2013) ("[T]hose who view crime as mostly caused by deeply rooted character traits
that are not shaped or influenced by biological, neuropsychological, environmental, and
other situational factors, are regularly found to be more punitive . . . ."); Joshua Greene,
From Neural 'Is'to Moral 'Ought': What Are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral
Psychology?, 4 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 847 (2003) (arguing that advances in
neuroscience call into question our current understanding of morality); Gerald Harrison,
Hooray! We're Not Morally Responsible!, THINK, Autumn 2009, at 87, 93-94 (explaining
why understanding of humans as "biological machines" should moderate our criminal
justice views); Nick Trakakis, Whither Morality in a Hard Determinist World, SORITES, Dec.
2007, at 14, 26-27 (discussing how determinism could lead to less retribution). But see R.
George Wright, Criminal Law and Sentencing: What Goes with Free Will? 5 DREXELL. REV.
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respect to the punishment of juveniles, for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court has relied upon scientific findings regarding
impulse control and risk assessment.286
Criminal and immigration policy must reflect what we know
about human behavior writ large. The focus on free will is a trap
because it obscures the critical observation that, in the aggregate,
people act according to the viable options available to them.287
While it is true that people choose whether to commit a crime, this
focus ignores the harsh reality of the diminished choices facing
many. Sole reliance on solutions that correlate with the free will
analysis-for example, cultural interventions with "at risk"
youth-is problematic for this reason, as others have noted.288
Rather than avoid discussing violent crime, we must reframe its
relevancy as an important indicator of the severity of structural
issues needing attention. Violent crime, in other words, is a
marker for just how deep of an institutional intervention is
needed.
1 (2012) (arguing that a view of crime that diminishes the role of free will would lead to
more, not less, punitive practices).
286. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 n.5 (2012) (citing Brief for the Am.
Psychological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, Miller, 132 S. Ct.
2455 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 174239); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)
(noting that "psychology and brain science" establish "fundamental differences between
juvenile and adult minds"); see also Alexandra 0. Cohen & B.J. Casey, Rewiring Juvenile
Justice: The Intersection of Developmental Neuroscience and Legal Policy, 28 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 63 (2014) (discussing developments in the neuroscientific study of juveniles
and how they relate to law and policy); Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience
Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78 (2008) (noting how risk
taking increases when a child becomes an adolescence due to the brain's "socio-emotional
system"). See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON ASSESSING JUVENILE JUSTICE
REFORM, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH (Richard J. Bonnie
et al. eds., 2013).
287. See CLEAR, supra note 123, at 186 (finding mass incarceration diminishes human
and social capital, reducing the choices available to people); Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social
Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental
Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 9-10, 76 (1985) (considering whether socioeconomic
deprivation can ever constitute a criminal defense); White, supra note 183, at 797-98
("[C]rime presents a real alternative to unemployment, underemployment, and relentless
poverty-an alternative made all the more appealing by recent, deleterious changes in the
structure of work, the availability of welfare, and the overall condition of the lower class.").
288. Kimberld Crenshaw explains, "Under [the 'at risk'] frame, the journey from
underachievement o jail is preventable not through active lobbying against the carceral
state and its many tributaries, but through the embrace of behavioral modifications
designed to bring 'at risk' individuals into compliance." Crenshaw, supra note 75, at 1466.
The "at risk" frame helps lead to the "subtle erasure of the structural and institutional
dimensions of social justice politics." Id. at 1465-66. The exclusive focus on reentry
programs suffers from the same critique. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 45, at 87 ("The focus
on improving the human capital of returning citizens through a work-first approach to
reentry ignores these larger structural forces that have been remaking the labor market
and altering the contours of inequality, especially for African Americans but also for poor
whites and members of other disadvantaged groups.").
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Racial justice proponents, much more so than those on the
forefront of the immigrant justice movement, have been better at
avoiding the free will trap. Michelle Alexander cites to studies
showing that "joblessness-not race or black culture-explains the
high rates of violent crime in poor black communities."28 9 She
warns that the "genius of the current caste system, and what most
distinguishes it from its predecessors, is that it appears
voluntary."290 Immigration reformers might borrow from this
analysis when constructing their narratives about immigrants
and crime.
E. Managing Migration, Not Crime
As Jennifer Chac6n has observed, immigration enforcement
"has morphed from a small and border-centered endeavor into a
huge effort involving a network of law enforcement agencies
operating throughout the country."291 Immigration law and policy
should return to a focus on the management of the flow of people
into our nation, rather than post-entry crime control. Support for
this view stems from the reality that U.S. society fosters criminal
activity as well as the historical fact that the first permanent
federal immigration restrictions applied only to people seeking
entry into the United States.292 General laws deporting people
from the interior were not put in place until the Immigration Act
of 1917.293 The original, regulatory view of federal immigration law
289. ALEXANDER, supra note 100, at 210. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON,
WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996).
290. ALEXANDER, supra note 100, at 215.
291. Chac6n, Diversion ofAttention, supra note 154, at 1571.
292. The first groups excluded by the federal government from the United States were
convicts and prostitutes. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974). This law
was followed by 1882 legislation excluding "convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take
care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge." General Immigration Act of 1882,
ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214. One of the earliest pieces of legislation was the expressly
nativist and racist Chinese Exclusion Act, which was upheld as constitutional and remained
in force until it was repealed in 1943. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58
(repealed 1943); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). Prior to the
enactment of federal border restrictions, towns and other localities created border restrictions
of their own to keep out or banish citizens and noncitizens considered undesirable. See Daniel
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard
Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L.REV. 1890,1908-9 (2000); Kunal M. Parker, Citizenship
and Immigration Law, 1800-1924: Resolutions of Membership and Territory, in 2 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 168, 170-75 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher
Tomlins eds., 2008).
293. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 361 (2010). Although early immigration
legislation in 1798 involved deporting noncitizens deemed dangerous, there was no political
will to reenact it after it expired after two years. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M.
RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 14 (5th ed. 2009); see also Padilla,
559 U.S. at 360 (citing Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570) (describing the "early effort to
empower the President to order ... deportation' as "short lived and unpopular").
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and policy focused on managing the flow of people into our country
rather than expulsion for post-entry undesirable behaviors. It
reflected a notion that the government could legitimately prevent
initial entry but, once a person was living among us, the
government could not uproot them from their families and
communities.294
In 1875, Congress passed the first general immigration
statute aimed at preventing the entry of prostitutes and people
convicted of certain crimes.95 With the exception of overtly racist
laws targeting Chinese people, the federal government did not
deport people from the interior. While the law expanded in 1891
to provide expulsion from the interior of anyone who had been
excludable at entry, the focus remained on people returning from
a trip abroad who were not entitled to enter in the first place. 296
Moreover, the law had a time limitation of one year, although this
limitation was later expanded to three.297 Over time, the
restriction on deportation for post-entry behavior eroded. By 1907,
the law permitted the deportation of noncitizen women and girls
who were determined to be prostitutes within three years of entry,
and, three years later, Congress removed the time limitation.298 In
1917, Congress passed the first immigration act to establish
general criminal grounds of deportation from the interior.299 Even
then, there was a statute of limitations of one to five years for
deportable offenses.300
U.S. immigration enforcement has become punitive rather
than regulatory, focusing resources on fighting crime through
deportation rather than managing migratory flows. Allegra
McLeod has critiqued the use of crime control as a "proxy" for
immigration regulation and the determination of membership
294. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
125 (2007) ("People were excluded for pre-entry crime, not generally deported for post-entry
crime."); Mae M. Ngai reports that in "the first decades of the 20th century, it was
considered unconscionable to expel . . .people," as epitomized by the statement of Judge
Learned Hand of New York "that deportation, especially when it tore people from their
homes and families, was 'barbarous and cruel."' Mae M. Ngai, We Need a Deportation
Deadline: Statute of Limitations on Unlawful Entry Would Humanely Address Illegal
Immigration, WASH. POST, June 14, 2005, at A21.
295. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. 477, 477-78 (repealed 1974).
296. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, §§ 1, 10, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084, 1086.
297. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 900, amended by Act of Mar. 26,
1910, ch. 128, 36 Stat. 263, 265 (repealed 1917).
298. Id.
299. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 301, ch. 25, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889.
300. Id. The statute of limitations was later repealed. See Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, tit. IV, § 403 (a)(13), (23), 66 Stat. 163, 279 (repealing
Act of Feb. 5, 1917, § 19).
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claims.301 She argues that we should seek to return to a state of
affairs in which our immigration and criminal systems are
distinct.302 Rather than use deportation as a crime control tool,
McLeod suggests that we should deploy our resources to
understand, and intervene in, what drives migration (for example,
by assisting "sending" countries).303 A return to the untethering of
immigration and crime control would reflect our nation's original
conception of immigration law as properly focused on managing
flows across the border. Such a return would also correspond to
the reality that the story of crime committed by immigrants is not
about immigrants or immigration, but about the root causes of
crime in the United States.
F. Understanding Mobility
A vision of immigration reform that seeks to dissolve the
deserving/undeserving immigrant distinction takes a big picture
view not only of crime, but also unauthorized immigration. Like
criminal behavior, mobility across national boundaries is best
understood as a multilevel and complex universal phenomenon
driven by political, economic, and social forces. As Mae M. Ngai
has illustrated, the category of "illegal aliens" is a construct that
has been made and unmade by U.S. policy choices.304 This view of
migration softens the distinction between legal and unauthorized
immigrants, supporting a more inclusive approach to legalization
for undocumented immigrants who have committed a crime while
in the United States.
Popular discourse typically portrays undocumented
immigration to the United States as simply people choosing to
transgress our border laws in order to seek a better life. We
subscribe to the myth of "liberal consensual citizenship," in which
immigrants are "still-enchanted newcomers" who, by choosing to
come, "reenact[] liberalism's .. . fictive foundation in individual
acts of uncoerced consent."305 This account is far too simple. While
there is little consensus on what drives people to cross national
borders, theorists broadly agree that both macro and micro factors
301. McLeod, supra note 25, at 113-14.
302. Id. at 178. McLeod's observations parallel those made in the juvenile justice
context. Prior to the rise of punitive strategies in the 1970s, juveniles were not given the
same procedural protections as adults on the theory that they were subject to treatment,
not a criminal process.
303. Id. at 174-75.
304. NGAI, supra note 35; see also Nicholas De Genova, The Legal Production of
Mexican/Migrant "Illegality," 2 LATINO STUD. 160, 177-78 (2004).
305. NGAI, supra note 35, at 5 (quoting BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE
FOREIGNER 75 (2001)).
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come into play.306 The first models of migration theory focused on
the microeconomics of mobility, concluding that people moved in
the direction of less populated, wealthier, and higher-wage
areas.307 Theorists focused on "push" factors in sending countries
and "pull" factors in receiving countries. Supporting this view is
the reality that when poor people from developing countries come
to the United States, their wage potential increases far beyond
what is possible in their home country.308 No action besides
migration is capable of having as much of an impact on wages.
According to the World Bank, migration of people seeking work is
increasing and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.309
The remittances sent by immigrants to family in their home
country play a substantial role in the economic stability of sending
countries.310
But theorists question whether migration can be fully
understood in microeconomic terms alone and have broadened the
scope of inquiry to include a wide range of other variables, such as
306. For a summary of the evolution of theories of migration, see ROBIN COHEN,
THEORIES OF MIGRATION (1996) (summarizing migration theories); Michael S. Tietelbaum,
Demographic Analyses of International Migration, in MIGRATION THEORY: TALKING ACROSS
DISCIPLINES 51, 59 (Caroline B. Brettell & James F. Hollifield eds., 2d ed. 2008) (contending
that "there are at least seven ... schools of migration theory, five from economics, the
remainder from sociology and political science").
307. See, e.g., E. G. Ravenstein, The Laws of Migration (pts. 1 & 2), 48 J. STAT. Soc'Y
LONDON 167 (1885), 52 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y 241(1889), reprinted in E. G. RAVENSTEIN, THE
LAWS OF MIGRATION (1976).
308. Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro & Lant Pritchett, The Place Premium:
Wage Differences for Identical Workers Across the U.S. Border 1-5, 13, 42, 45-48, 53-54, 56
(Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 148, 2008), http://cgdev.org/files/16352_file
CMP-place-premium_148.pdf (arguing that migration ameliorates poverty more
effectively than any other policy because wages in the United States are so comparatively
high). Lant Pritchett argues that permitting people from developing countries to work in
the United States is the best development policy because a low-wage worker from a
developing country would only have to work a few weeks in the United States to increase
the money he would earn in a lifetime in which he was able to access financing for small
business activities in his home country. LANT PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE COME:
BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK ON INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOBILITY 2 (2006); Lant Pritchett, The
Cliff at the Border, in EQUITY AND GROWTH IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 263, 274-76 (Ravi
Kanbur & Michael Spence eds., 2010).
309. The World Bank stated in a recent annual report that worldwide labor mobility
trends will lead migration to remain at the center of contentious political debates
worldwide. Paul Wolfowitz, Foreword to WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS:
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION, at vii (2006), https://openkno
wledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/7306/343200GEP2006.pdf sequence=1.
310. According to a Pew Research report, the United States is the most important
source of money sent home by migrants from seventeen Latin-American nations. U.S.
remittances accounted for three-quarters of the total in 2012-$41 billion out of $52.9
billion-according to World Bank data. D'Vera Cohn, Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Danielle
Cuddington, Remittances to Latin America Recover-but Not to Mexico, PEW RES. CTR.:
HISP. TRENDS (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/11/15/remittances-to
-latin-america-recover-but-not-to-mexico/.
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"geographical distance between origin and
destination, . . . political barriers, . . . gender, , age, class, and
education."311 Some point to the role of family and community
networks and the prevalence of industries, such as smuggling
operations, to help people migrate.312 Demographics also help to
explain migratory patterns. The U.S. population is rapidly aging,
due to low death and birth rates and a large population of aging
baby boomers. Immigration supplies us with the young workers
our economy requireS.313 As reported by the Congressional
Research Service, undocumented workers satisfy certain labor
needs of our country.314
Migration to the United States from Central America and
Mexico must also be understood in the context of post-colonialism
and U.S. political and economic interventions. As Americans, "we
resist examining the role that American world power has played
in the global structures of migration."315 Nicaragua, for example,
was a U.S. battlefront in the Cold War. After the left-leaning
Sandinistas took control, President Reagan, acting through an
executive order, intervened to try and restore President Somoza to
power, triggering a flow of people fleeing the violence.316 In El
311. KAREN O'REILLY, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND SOCIAL THEORY 42 (2012)
(summarizing the 1966 work of Everett Lee).
312. The migration business theory is dominant in analyses of smuggling, but some
analysts are looking at the role of family members and social networks. See UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS: A GLOBAL REVIEW AND
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS 7-8 (2011) (citing SHELDON X.
ZHANG, CHINESE HUMAN SMUGGLING ORGANIZATIONS: FAMILIES, SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND
CULTURAL IMPERATIVES 7-11 (2008)); Emma Herman, Migration as a Family Business: The
Role of Personal Networks in the Mobility Phase of Migration, INT'L MIGRATION, Oct. 2006,
at 191, 217.
313. RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE JOBS
RECOVERY: EMPLOYMENT GAINS BY RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER AND NATIVITY 9-13 (2012),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/03/PHC-Labor-report-FINAL 3-21-12.pdf (finding
that immigrants are increasingly more likely to be employed because their working age
population is growing at a faster rate than that of the native population); RAKESH
KOCHHAR, ROBERTO SURO & SONYA TAFOYA, PEWRESEARCH CTR., THE NEW LATINO SOUTH:
THE CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES OF RAPID POPULATION GROWTH 16-18 (2005),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/50.pdf (noting that the median age of Hispanics is
twenty-seven, and the increase in population and the growth of local economies in the U.S.
South "have acted as a magnet to young, male, foreign-born Latinos migrating in search of
economic opportunities").
314. LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30395, FARM LABOR SHORTAGES AND
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1, 13 (2009) (stating that because "perishable crop growers have
rarely, if ever, had to operate without unauthorized aliens," it is difficult to know whether
"there would be an adequate supply of authorized U.S. farm workers"). The Department of
Labor estimated that in FY1999-FY2000, foreign-born persons in the country illegally
accounted for 55% of the domestic crop workforce. Id. at 3.
315. NGAI, supra note 35, at 11.
316. James M. Scott, Interbranch Rivalry and the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua, 112
POL. Sci. Q. 237, 243 (1997).
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Salvador and Guatemala, the United States funded and trained
military regimes battling guerilla groups, contributing to years of
protracted violence that claimed the lives of 200,000 people.317
These actions of the United States also generated a refugee flow of
nearly one million and contributed to the political and economic
instability of these countries that endures to this day.318
At the most macro level, migration can be viewed as a
necessary feature of global capitalism-a system in which poor
countries supply cheap labor to rich countries.319 Undocumented
immigrants play a vital role in this scheme. Mexico, for example,
has increasingly become open to foreign investment, which has
resulted in displaced workers and the removal of price regulations
that formerly protected local industries.3 20 NAFTA has been
criticized for displacing people out of their normal labor activities,
pushing them to migrate to the United States.321 Free trade now
permits large U.S. growers to flood the Mexican market with corn,
putting small Mexican corn farmers out of work. 322 After NAFTA
was implemented in 1994, more people migrated from Mexico to
the United States than during any other period of time.323
317. Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, In Central America, Reagan Remains a Polarizing
Figure, WASH. POST (June 10, 2004), http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn
/articles/A29546-2004Jun9.html.
318. Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era,
MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), http://migrationpolicy.org/article/central
-americans-and-asylum-policy-reagan-era. For a discussion of the political and economic
causes of drug violence in Mexico, see Deborah M. Weissman, Remaking Mexico: Law
Reform as Foreign Policy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1471 (2014). See also supra note 269
(discussing how U.S. deportations of gang members fostered the emergence of gangs in
Central America and Mexico).
319. Isabella Bakker & Stephen Gill, Global Political Economy and Social
Reproduction, in POWER, PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION 3, 5 (Isabella Bakker &
Stephen Gill eds., 2003) (discussing how current global governance facilitates transnational
corporations); Aristide R. Zolberg, The Next Waves: Migration Theory for a Changing World,
23 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 403, 404-05 (1989) (proposing a migratory theory grounded in the
fact of inequality). See generally TANYA MARIA GOLASH-BOZA, DEPORTED: POLICING
IMMIGRANTS, DISPOSABLE LABOR, AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2015).
320. David Bacon explains, "Beginning around 1980, the World Bank and the IMF
[International Monetary Fund] began imposing a one-size-fits-all formula for development,
called structural adjustment programs. These required borrowing countries to adopt a
package of economic reforms, such as privatization, ending subsidies and price controls,
trade liberalization, and reduced worker protections." DAVID BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE: How
GLOBALIZATION CREATES MIGRATION AND CRIMINALIZES IMMIGRANTS 60 (2008).
321. See DAVID BACON, THE RIGHT TO STAY HOME: How US POLICY DRIVES MEXICAN
MIGRATION 11 (2013); ARIADNA ESTtVEZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREE TRADE IN MEXICO: A
DISCURSIVE AND SOCIOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (2008).
322. BACON, supra note 320, at 25 ("[O]nce the [free trade] agreement went into effect
it became cheaper for large Mexican corn growers to buy U.S. corn and resell it than to grow
corn themselves. For the vast majority, however, like . . . small farmers, the price for yellow
corn . . . simply couldn't cover the cost of growing it.").
323. Id. at 51.
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The movement for immigrant justice stands to gain from the
narrative of mobility as a natural feature of human existence and
a product of U.S. policy abroad. Immigration reformers should
seek to replace the mainstream view of why people come to the
United States with a more accurate narrative that emphasizes the
policy level explanations for migration.324 In this picture, unlawful
migration becomes an inevitable consequence of larger forces
instead of simple rule-breaking activity by individuals. Such a
move might facilitate keeping the immigration debate focused on
policy rather than the retributivist impulse to withhold legal
status from those who crossed the border without permission. This
shift in thinking could also help erode the distinction between
undocumented people with criminal convictions and those who are
in lawful status.
G. The Victim Narrative
Reframing immigration reform discourse requires careful
attention to the labeling of certain classes of immigrants as victims
or innocents. In parallel to the rise in punitiveness that started in
the 1970s, the crime victim has "emerge [d] as an idealized political
subject."32 5 The immigrant-as-victim narrative is potent, enabling
powerful messaging that has resulted in entire new categories of
immigration remedies.326 The most prominent example is the
broad set of remedies for immigrant victims of violent crimes,
including intimate partner violence.327 The crime victim legislative
gains have been so significant that advocates now routinely screen
324. See Weissman, supra note 2, at 202-03 (discussing the need "to shift the narrative
[to] address [ the larger context for drug cartel violence and the root causes of migration").
325. SIMON, supra note 31, at 8. For a discussion of the movement against gender
violence's "appeal[] to the ideology of the 'deserving poor' and the 'victim,"' see Mark Matthew
Graham, Domestic Violence Victims and Welfare "Reform" The Family Violence Option in
Illinois, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 433, 470 (2002) (citing LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT
ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994)); see also id. at
476 (discussing advocates who lobby on behalf of abused women utilizing the "deserving poor"
and "victim" rhetoric, and how this is damaging to the societal image of abused women).
326. See Michael Kagan, Immigrant Victims, Immigrant Accusers, 48 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 915, 922-25 (2015) (discussing immigration remedies for victims of crime).
327. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV (codified
in scattered sections of of 42 U.S.C.); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi)
(2015). The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in providing that the Attorney General
may grant status to noncitizens who have been domestically battered or subjected to extreme
cruelty in the United States, provides protection not only to those presently experiencing
battery, but also to those who experienced battery in the past. Immigration law also provides
remedies for victims of sex and labor trafficking and enumerated violent crimes. For an
overview of the relief available to immigrant victims, see PENN STATE LAw'S CTR. FOR
IMIVIIGRANTS' RIGHTS & CTR. CTY. WOMEN'S RES. CTR., IMMIGRATION RELIEF FOR VICTIMS OF
ABUSE AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE TO SERVING NON-CITIZENS (2012),
https://law.psu.eduLfile/Immigrants/toolkit2Ol2/Handbook.pdf.
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for victim.status and a large percentage of direct service resources
are dedicated to helping people access relief under these laws.328
Without diminishing the importance of the life-saving
remedies now available to immigrant victims, it is critical to
understand the limitations of the framing of immigrants as
victims for the purposes of immigration reform. First and
foremost, such messaging relies on an implicit contrast with
several groups of people, including immigrants who are not
victims and immigrants and citizens who create victims by
committing crimes.329 The category of immigrant victim, like the
broader category of victim, connotes a bright line, good/bad
distinction between victims and lawbreakers, whereas reality is
much more nuanced.330 A significant number of victims have
themselves been convicted of crimes, including violent ones.3 3 1
Moreover, the perpetrator/victim distinction itself can be
complicated, as some situations involve mutual aggression, such
that the person who calls the police first often receives the victim
status. The fluid boundaries of the concept of a victim detract
from its usefulness as a basis for drawing distinctions between
people.
Immigrant-as-victim messaging constructs a category of
undocumented immigrants whose sin of being unlawfully
present is outweighed by their victim status. But this
messaging also makes it difficult to argue for humane and
proportionate responses to immigrants who are convicted of a
crime. If only immigrant victims are worthy, logic dictates that
we should deport as unworthy immigrants who are convicted
of a crime. In the simple world of victim and perpetrator, there
is no room for the latter.
328. Rocio Molina et al., Screening for Victims Who Qualify for Immigration Protective




329. Other stereotypes might also be in play, such as the portrayal of victims of
domestic violence as passive and lacking agency. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24-30 (1991); Ann
Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between Lawyer and
Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (1997).
330. For a discussion of how our human trafficking laws should recognize the reality
of trafficking survivors' lives, see Srikantiah, supra note 74, at 191-92, 211.
331. Domestic violence victimization or fighting back accounts for some, but not all, of
these crimes. See SHERYL KUBIAK ET AL., BEST PRACTICE TOOLKIT FOR WORKING WITH
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS WITH CRIMINAL HISTORIES 14 (2011), http://community
solutionsva.org/files/PREA-ToolkitWorkingwithSurvivors wCriminalHistories.pdf
(detailing the common profile of women involved in the criminal legal system, including
survivors of domestic and/or sexual violence).
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The temptation, of course, is to use victim messaging precisely
because it is so very effective. The public has been trained to take
a reductive view of the categories of victim and perpetrator.
Reformers, however, should not ignore the downsides of invoking
the victim narrative in the cause of immigrant justice. As a version
of respectability politics, the victim narrative not only makes it
harder to advocate for noncitizens and citizens convicted of a crime
(and other people not dubbed victims), but it reinforces the
underlying economic and social policies that drive crime rates and
migratory flows.
VII. REFRAMING IN ACTION
Strategic reframing away from the immigrant/criminal
dichotomy and toward a new discourse that reflects a structural
understanding of crime and unauthorized migration is already
taking place in some immigrant justice circles, although truly
inclusive messaging is extremely difficult in the current political
climate.332 It is not easy to craft an effective message for
immigration reform that resonates but refrains from tapping into
the deserving/undeserving immigrant narrative.
Like many in the movement for racial justice, progressive
reformers have become increasingly aware of the downsides of
respectability messaging. Some advocates for legalization of the
undocumented have come to understand that members of this
group share the status of "undesirable others" with people
convicted of a crime, and that women, men, and children who are
members of both groups are worth including in reform efforts.
Groups that initially relied on contrasting immigrants and
criminals have now jettisoned this rhetoric, adopting a more
inclusive vision of reform.333
Many in the Dreamer movement have adopted a messaging
campaign aimed at disrupting the worthy immigrant narrative.
Although the Administration and other mainstream reformers
portray Dreamers as innocent victims, Dreamers themselves have
typically aligned themselves with their parents, refusing to seek
legitimacy at their expense.334 Much of the Dreamer messaging
332. The Fight of Our Lives (Families for Freedom, New York, N.Y.), Fall 2013, at 1,
http://issuu.com/andalusiafffldocs/fffnewsletterfallissuu20l3#embed; General Messaging
for Fair and Inclusive Reform, IMMIGRANT JUST. NETWORK, http:/immigrantjusticenet
work.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/IJNmessagingAugust.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2016);
IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, http://immigrantdefenseproject.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
333. Novoa, supra note 217 (calling for support of immigrants with criminal
convictions or drug dependencies); The Fight of Our Lives, supra note 332, at 1-2.
334. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) relief is the temporary status
accorded to certain young people who meet certain conditions and who arrived before they
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avoids the criminal-immigrant dichotomy and Dreamers conduct
campaigns to stop deportation of people with criminal
convictions.335 Movement actors are aware that arguing for lawful
status for Dreamers makes it harder to argue for more inclusive
reform.
Many Dreamers know what it is like to be part of the informal
economy and to spend one's formative years in neighborhoods with
substandard schools, low social capital, a heavy law enforcement
presence, and high levels of street crime. At the same time,
Dreamers are generally accepted as part of respectable society.336
They act as what Regina Austin has termed "bridge people"
because they span the gap between members of respectable society
and outcasts, including convicted noncitizens.337 Dreamers can be
understood as leveraging their perceived status as innocents to
call that category into question. Even as the Administration and
mainstream reformers engage in line-drawing between Dreamers
and others, many Dreamers resist.338
Similarly, the New York-based group Families for Freedom
rejects "the legalization of our daughters and sons in exchange for
the banishment of our mothers [and] fathers."339 The group is "an
organizing center against deportation" that runs campaigns for
people facing deportation, including people with criminal
convictions. The organization consciously tries to avoid rhetoric
that contrasts immigrants with people convicted of a crime. In an
article posted on the group's website, the phrase "We're not
criminals!" is described as "probably the most embarrassing,
anti-criminal justice, anti-black mantra of the mainstream
movement."3 40
Nonexclusionary messaging also appears in core principles for
immigration reform endorsed by the groups that make up the
were sixteen. As noted above, President Obama and others have justified this program of
according temporary status through the victim narrative. See supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
335. Prominent Dreamer activist Gaby Pacheco, for example, understands "that
portraying the dreamers as deserving implicitly casts others-including their parents-as
undeserving lawbreakers." MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA, at xxvii (Princeton Univ. Press 2014) (2004). As a result,
many Dreamers "fight] for legalization for all unauthorized migrants." Id.
336. Amanda Sakuma, Obama: DREAMers Are 'Americans, Just Like Us', MSNBC
(Feb. 20, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://msnbc.comlmsnbc/obama-dreamers-are-americans-just-us.
337. Austin, supra note 62, at 1799.
338. Walter Nicholls & Tara Fiorito, Dreamers Unbound: Immigrant Youth
Mobilizing, NEW LAB. F. (Jan. 19, 2015) http://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/2015/01/19
/dreamers-unbound-immigrant-youth-mobilizing/ (explaining the difference between
"bounded" and "unbounded" Dreamers).
339. The Fight of Our Lives, supra note 332.
340. Novoa, supra note 217.
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coalition Immigrant Justice Network. This group describes their
guiding principles as based on "Fair and Inclusive Reform that
Restores Discretion and Curbs Criminalization."341 The groups
who are part of this network consciously refrain from drawing
contrasts between groups of immigrants and endorse generous
immigration reform that restores discretion of judges to stop
deportations.34 2
Some reform groups expressly link immigrant justice to the
racial justice movement to end hyperincarceration. For example,
the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI), founded in 2006,
is "an education and advocacy group comprised of African
Americans and black immigrants from Africa, Latin America and
the Caribbean."343 Opal Tometi, BAJI's Executive Director, is a
cofounder of Black Lives Matter, a group that has called for
criminal justice reforms in the wake of police killings of Michael
Brown and Eric Garner. The group "links the interests of African
Americans with those of immigrants of color [and] emphasizes the
impact of racism and economic globalization on African American
and immigrant communities as a basis for forging alliances across
these communities."3 44  Other groups make the same
connections.345
Seeking to reframe the debate on immigration reform, these
groups have jettisoned the narrative of respectable immigrants in
favor of more inclusive messaging.346 Their rhetoric and actions
focus on structural change, including investment in communities,
divestment from prisons and detention centers, and ending
government corruption, corporate welfare, social control, and
impunity. For these groups, safety is not a function of locking
341. General Messaging for Fair and Inclusive Reform, supra note 332.
342. The Immigrant Justice Network includes organizations like the National
Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild and the Immigrant Defense Project. See
IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, supra note 332 ("[The group promotes] fundamental fairness for
immigrants accused or convicted of crimes by working to transform unjust deportation laws
and policies and educating and advising immigrants, their criminal defenders, and other
advocates."). Even this progressive coalition, however, has found it effective to illustrate its
positions by giving examples of people who were "brought to the U.S. as a child, ... served
in the U.S. military, or committed a minor crime." General Messaging for Fair and Inclusive
Reform, supra note 332. The principles also invoke images of immigrants as hard workers
and "contributing members of our community," implying that immigrants who might
require public entitlements are not as deserving. Id.
343. About Us, BLACK ALLIANCE FOR JUST IMMIGR., http://idealist.org/view/nonprofit
/35PFjkMpMnWmD/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
344. Id.
345. See, e.g., BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited
Feb. 6, 2016).
346. Examples include the slogans: "Not One More [Deportation]," "System Change
Not Prison Chains," and "Divest From Prisons, Invest in Communities."
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people up for long periods of time or deporting them, but flows from
investing in communities that create economic opportunities and
protective social networks.347 Undocumented immigration is
understood in the context of globalization and U.S. economic and
political policies abroad.348
Although the goal is system change, individual stories play a
role in the political strategies of these organizations. Unlike
mainstream respectability narratives, however, the stories told by
these groups feature a much wider cross-section of immigrants,
including people with significant criminal convictions. People like
Jose and Ronald, discussed above, fall within the scope of their
concern.349 These progressive reformers portray convicted
noncitizens as multidimensional human beings rather than as
deviant contrasts for more respectable immigrants.3 50
VIII.CONCLUsIoN
The demonization of convicted noncitizens is not only
convenient and effective, at least in the short term, but it appears
morally justified. What could be less controversial than proposing
that immigrants with criminal convictions, especially violent ones,
be denied, or stripped of, lawful status and deported? I have sought
to complicate the answer to this question, arguing that reformers
and theorists must retool the standard tropes regarding
noncitizens with criminal convictions.
The downside of seeking reform for only immigrants without
criminal histories, or only minor records, is not only that convicted
noncitizens are left out. Rather, the fear is that the immigration
reform movement is legitimizing and perpetuating the crime
347. Novoa, supra note 217 (describing how drug dependencies require public health
solutions and calling for a resistance to policies that create distance between families and
communities rather thanjsupporting them).
348. See supra Part VI.F (explaining the political and economic forces behind
migration).
349. See supra notes 24-32 and text accompanying.
350. For discussion of the limitations of viewing people solely by the worst thing that
they have done in their life, see GOTTSCHALK, supra note 45, at 165-66, 184 (characterizing
as "misleading" the "view that offenders should be defined forever by the seriousness of the
offense that initially sent them away" and noting that most "people sentenced to life or the
death penalty are not 'monstrous others' who pose infinite threats to public safety") (quoting
CATHERINE A. APPLETON, LIFE AFTER IMPRISONMENT 76 (2010)); Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing
Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705 (2011) ("Th[e]
extraordinary focus on the moment of the crime conflicts with the fundamental notion of
the individual as a collection of many moments composing our experiences, relationships,
and circumstances. It frames out circumstances, conduct, experiences, or relationships that
tell a different story about the individual, closing off the potential for redemption and
disregarding the collateral effects on the people and communities with ties to the
noncitizen.").
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control agenda and attendant harms of hyperincarceration in the
same way that other movements have in the past.3 5 1 Seeking
reform within the ideology of crime control leaves unchallenged
the deeper structures that give rise to hyperincarceration and
other excesses of civil and criminal law enforcement.352
A reconceived approach would place convicted noncitizens at
the center of analysis. Rather than serve as foils for "better"
immigrants who deserve membership, these individuals would be
subjects situated at the intersection of our criminal and civil
immigration systems of hyperincarceration. To resist this
reframing is to perpetuate incoherence in how we analyze law
enforcement in the criminal and immigration contexts. One cannot
accept the racial and class critique of hyperincarceration and
continue to treat convicted noncitizens as outsiders in the
immigration reform agenda.
The challenge ahead is to work toward aligning a theory of
immigrant justice with the well-developed, and now popularized,
racial and class analysis of criminal hyperincarceration. Of course,
charting such a course is easier said than done. Success depends
on the ability to popularize a structural view of the causes of crime
and unauthorized migration. Such a move requires dialing back
personal reactions to crime and unauthorized border crossings,
reactions that may be deeply rooted in the human psyche.
Particularly challenging is popularizing the narrative of how
violent crime calls not for excessively punitive law enforcement,
but increased attention to the material conditions of people's lives.
The proper, bird's eye view looks at conditions not only nationally
but globally.
Immigration reformers may never fully conform their
movement to the critique of hyperincarceration, but such
alignment must remain as an ultimate goal. Truly inclusive
messaging may exist as an unattainable, infinite horizon, always
balanced with a pragmatic approach that draws upon examples of
worthy immigrants. In Durkheim's terms, we may never entirely
eliminate the criminal other as a way of cohering society through
"common indignation."353 Even if reformers must accede to
discrete political compromises of the moment, the benchmark
against which progress is judged must include reform for convicted
noncitizens, including those convicted of more serious crimes.
351. See McLeod, supra note 25, at 178 (describing how immigration reform based on
the criminal law undermines preferable immigration regulatory regimes).
352. Id.
353. DURKHEIM, supra note 28, at 58.
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